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ABSTRACT 
Florian Stöckel: ‘Solidarity among Strangers’? 
Citizenship, Identity, and Ambivalent Attitudes in Europe 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of citizens’ attitudes towards European 
integration, focusing in particular on the causes and consequences of political identities. What 
generates a collective identity in a political community of different nations? What effects does a 
collective European identity have on relations among EU-citizens and their approval of authority 
transfers to supranational institutions? The first study examines the structure of citizens’ attitudes 
towards the EU. Based on an analysis of Eurobarometer data and the Chapel Hill expert survey I 
show that citizens are more ambivalent and less positive about the EU when elite division on 
European integration is more pronounced. Affective cues, such as an attachment to the EU, are 
powerful factors that explain both low levels of ambivalence and low levels of indifference 
towards the EU. In the second study I test Karl Deutsch’s argument on the role of social 
interactions for community building in Europe. I apply insights from social psychology to 
explain when and why contact between individuals from different national backgrounds can lead 
to a collective European identity. I conducted a panel survey with about 1500 students from 38 
German universities. Individuals were surveyed before, during, and after their stay in another 
European country. My results show that contact with other international students rather than 
contact with students from the host country fosters a collective European identity most 
effectively. Also, transnational social interactions have a more profound impact on individuals 
! iv!
with a weak European identity to begin with. In the third study I use the same panel data to test 
implications of this identity change. A more pronounced European identity is related to viewing 
other Europeans as co-citizens with equal rights rather than as immigrants with limited rights. 
Individuals who develop a stronger European identity are more likely to support an equal access 
to jobs and local elections for citizens from other EU member states in Germany. Additionally, 
identity change motivates an endorsement for the transfer of political authority to the EU level. 
However, identity change affects left leaning citizens’ attitudes more directly than attitudes of 
their right leaning peers.!  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“If Europe is to be able to act on the basis of an integrated, multilevel policy then 
European citizens, who are initially characterized as such only by their common 
passports, will have to learn to mutually recognize one another as members of a common 
political existence beyond national borders...” (Habermas 2001: 99) 
 
 
 
In Europe, political authority is exercised at the subnational and national level, but far-
reaching decisions are also taken at a level above the nation state by institutions of the European 
Union (EU). While elites tend to support supranational decision making, large numbers of 
citizens in many European countries view giving up national sovereignty along with political 
authority skeptically (Hooghe 2003). This public discontent raises concerns regarding the 
conditions under which a political community can be created where authority is shifted to bodies 
outside the nation state. The Euro crisis highlights an even more sensitive topic by requiring 
member states to pool considerable financial resources. Against this background, the conditions 
under which citizens develop a sense of community and civic solidarity in the EU form the 
starting point of my project. 
My perspective on the possibility of a democratic polity above the national state in 
Europe is influenced by work of Jürgen Habermas. Reminding us of the development of civic 
solidarity in national communities in the 19th and 20th century, Habermas argues that there is 
reason to believe that a comparable process is conceivable at the European level (Habermas 
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2001). However, as he notes, the critical issue is whether Europeans come to think of themselves 
as members of a shared community (Habermas 2012). Karl W. Deutsch’s work on social 
interactions among individuals from diverse backgrounds suggests a powerful mechanism with 
profound implications for European integration. His bottom-up perspective on community 
building guides this project.  
The objective is to contribute to our understanding of public opinion on European 
integration in general and the role of citizens’ political identities in particular. I draw on political 
psychology to specify micro foundations and I use new data to test my conjectures. The 
subsequent papers are driven by the following research questions: First, what is the role of 
identity in structuring attitudes towards the EU? Second, can social interactions among 
individuals from different national backgrounds shape a sense of community among Europeans? 
And third, how do identity and ideology facilitate and constrain civic solidarity among 
Europeans? 
 
Theoretical Work that Motivates this Project 
 This project is strongly influenced by the works of two scholars – Habermas and Deutsch 
– who have laid out the theoretical terrain for today’s empirical work on European identity. My 
point of departure is Habermas’ intriguing term of ‘solidarity among strangers.’ This seems a 
pertinent term to characterize the fragility of the solidaristic bonds in the current European 
Union. However, Habermas’ work draws attention to two basic historical developments that cast 
doubt on the presumed fragility of EU solidarity.  
First, Habermas emphasizes that once national solidarity was fragile too. In fact, he used 
the notion of solidarity among strangers to describe the initial state of solidarity in national states 
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(Habermas 1996: 308, Habermas 2001: 64-65, Habermas 2006: 76). Originally, individuals had 
loyalties to their family members as well as to other individuals in the same town or village. 
Solidarity existed first and foremost among individuals who knew each other personally. 
Individuals might have been bound together legally, but there was no strong sense of community. 
A sense of unity among individuals who did not know each other and who did not previously 
think of each other as belonging together was only generated by political mobilization. A 
politically mobilized national consciousness created more abstract ties rooted in the idea of a 
shared history and language. Individuals from different social and religious groups came to think 
of each other as a community – despite being strangers to one another (Habermas 1996, 1998, 
2001).1 For Habermas (2001: 64-65), the “modern territorial state thus depends on the 
development of a national consciousness to provide it with the cultural substrate for a civil 
solidarity. […] While remaining strangers to one another, members of the same “nation” feel 
responsible enough for one another that they are prepared to make “sacrifices” – as in military 
service or the burden of redistributive taxation.”2  
Habermas acknowledges that the political mobilization of a national consciousness 
(Habermas 2001: 103) involved violence, but he downplays the vast extent to which this process 
involved force in order to integrate territories and coercion to instill the notion of national unity 
in individuals (Gellner 2008, Marks 2012). Although it is the constructed nature of ‘solidarity 
among strangers’ on the national level that gives Habermas reason to envision similar ties on a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Anderson (1991: 6) emphasizes a closely related and widely cited point in his definition of a nation as an imagined 
community: „It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives an image of their community.“ 
 
2 Later, Habermas (2006: 77) added that civic solidarity is thin even within nation states: “Civic solidarity is in any 
case paid for in small change: income tax replaces the heroic duty to sacrifice one’s life for one’s country.”      
Nice.”  
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European scale, what it implies is that such ties can be created even without the coercion that 
characterized the mobilization of national identity.  
Habermas offers a second argument for why Europe may be able to develop solidarity: 
the transformation of the basis of solidarity in national states from a rigid notion of ethnic 
patriotism to a more flexible understanding of constitutional patriotism. At least in postwar 
Europe, civic solidarity within nation states is based much less on ties that have their source in 
some form of national consciousness or imagined national ethnie (Habermas 2006). A shared 
legal framework and legal practices fuel civic solidarity rather than the belief in a fatherland. 
Habermas defines this devotion to the democratic process as constitutional patriotism (Habermas 
2006: 78). Since civic solidarity today stems from constitutional patriotism rather than from a 
fatherland myth, citizens have shifted their emotional focus away from the nation.  Hence, they 
should be well prepared to develop a sense of unity based on shared legal practices at the 
European level (Habermas 2006). 
Few Europeans think of themselves primarily as Europeans and give up their national 
identity. Yet, at least a share of Europeans identify with Europe in addition to holding a national 
identity (Duchesne and Frognier 1995, Hooghe and Marks 2005, Risse 2010). Risse (2010: 61) 
calls this secondary identity a European identity “lite,” which does however raise a number of 
questions: Does a European identity lite have a psychological existence, how is it generated, and 
does it imply some type of solidarity among Europeans?  
It is exactly the conditions under which individuals from diverse national backgrounds 
can come to think of themselves as a community in a meaningful way, where Deutsch’s path 
breaking studies prove particularly enlightening. His early work is primarily on nationalism, 
although the mechanism he describes is not bound to community formation within national 
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borders (Deutsch 1953, 1953a). The basic premise of his work is that the technological 
infrastructure and social communication channeled through it is constitutive for the emergence of 
a sense of community among subgroups of a nation. Deutsch (1953) shows how economic, 
social, and technological developments can mobilize individuals for intense communication 
among them. Once an infrastructure is in place, communication can create close ties between 
urban centers and peripheral areas. As communication intensifies, participating individuals come 
to think of themselves as a community. And because communication among individuals within a 
nation is so much more intense than across nations, the sense of belonging within these 
communities is constantly reinforced. 
Deutsch pointed to implications of his work for supra-national integration processes 
(1953a). His main work on communities at an international level is on the conditions under 
which networks of interactions can contribute to a “security community” of different countries 
(Deutsch et al. 1957), which he relates specifically to European integration. Hence, Deutsch 
frames the background for a transactionalist approach to identity formation that transcends 
national boundaries. Yet, he was less concerned with the psychological underpinnings of identify 
formation at the individual level. Most importantly, the empirical evidence on the role of social 
interactions for community building in Europe is yet surprisingly inconclusive.  
My contribution proposes an understanding of attitude and identity formation informed 
by social and political psychology. Using a pre-post test design with control group I can show 
the conditions that lead to a collective identity among individuals from diverse national 
backgrounds in Europe. I find this more pronounced European identity to have implications for 
how Europeans see their peers from other EU member states as well as for preferences on the 
political integration of Europe. Cross sectional analysis shows that a significant share of citizens 
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is ambivalent about the EU, that is to say they hold both positive and negative views on the EU 
simultaneously. An emotional attachment to the EU is however one of the strongest factors 
shaping outright support for the EU. In sum, I find tentative evidence for civic solidarity among 
Europeans. Future research needs to tackle what it implies for transnational redistribution in the 
EU, which is what I begin to discuss in a final paper. 
 
Outline of the Four Papers of the Dissertation 
 The first paper addresses the basic structure of European citizens’ attitudes towards the 
EU.3 My point of departure is that citizens may not exhibit outright support or opposition to the 
EU, but could be ambivalent or indifferent. Therefore, I suggest a measure that differentiates 
ambivalence from indifference in public attitudes towards the EU. Based on an analysis of data 
from Eurobarometer 63.4 and the Chapel Hill expert survey I find a large share of Europeans to 
be ambivalent and only a small minority to be indifferent towards the EU. Moreover, my study 
reveals that the causes of indifference and ambivalence are fundamentally different. Multinomial 
multilevel regression analysis shows that cognitive cues – such as knowledge on the EU and 
media consumption – increase levels of ambivalence. Additionally, individuals are more 
ambivalent and less positive about the EU when elite division on European integration is more 
salient. In contrast, indifference is most prevalent when both cognitive and affective cues are 
absent. Affective cues, such as trust in EU institutions and affective involvement with the EU, 
are among the most powerful factors that explain low levels of ambivalence and low levels of 
indifference towards the EU, as well as a high level of outright support. In sum, an 
overwhelming majority of Europeans holds meaningful attitudes on European integration, and an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 This paper is published in European Union Politics, 14.1 (2013): 23-45. 
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emotional involvement with the EU – like a European identity – seems to be a key predictor for 
support of the EU. 
In the second paper, I apply Deutsch’s logic and examine if social interactions among 
Europeans contribute to a collective European identity (Deutsch 1953). Previous work on this 
issue presents surprisingly inconclusive results and suffers from endogeneity problems. My study 
entails two contributions to this literature. First, I employ insights from social psychology to 
describe the micro foundations of why social interactions can lead to a collective identity. 
Second, I use new panel data to probe causal effects. I surveyed about 1500 individuals at 38 
German universities before they left to study one or two terms in another European country and 
shortly after they came back. A third survey wave took place five months after students  
returned. The panel study with control group allows me to analyze causal effects more reliably 
than research based on cross sectional data because the consequences of contact can be traced 
within individuals and over time. My findings indicate that transnational social interactions can 
help bring about a collective European identity. Precise data on the type of interactions students 
have while abroad make it possible to further examine the causal process. This analysis 
emphasizes that it is social interactions of German students with other international students that 
contribute to a collective European identity most effectively, while interactions between study 
abroad students and their hosts do not have a similar outcome. I also find that social interactions 
have a more intense impact on students with a weak European identity before going abroad. 
Finally, the panel data provide evidence for a recalibration of political identities that is stable 
many months after individuals have returned. 
 In the third paper, I examine Habermas’ proposition on the pivotal nature of a collective 
European identity for the social and a political integration of Europe. The change in students’ 
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European identity after returning from an intra-European study abroad provides me with a 
unique opportunity to study implications of identity change for attitudes on European integration. 
I operationalize the social dimension of European integration along two lines: first, the extent to 
which Germans approve of equal opportunities for individuals from other EU member states on 
the German job market, and second, the extent to which these foreigners should be allowed to 
vote in German local elections. I examine support for the political dimension of European 
integration in the following ways: an individual’s interest in EU affairs, support for authority 
transfers to Brussels, and intention to vote in European parliamentary elections. I find that 
identity change has implications for both the social and political dimension of European 
integration. However, the strength of this link depends on ideological orientation. Left leaning 
individuals who deepen their European identity change more than right leaning individuals. That 
is to say, their views on non-German EU citizens in Germany and on the political integration of 
Europe become considerably more favorable, while the attitudes of right leaning individuals 
barely budge. Among right leaning individuals, only a very strong identity change seems to leave 
an imprint on other attitudes. 
 In my final paper, I put forth a research design to analyze constraints on public support 
for transnational redistribution in Europe. Based on the previous chapters and my other work 
(Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014), I develop hypotheses on what may affect public support for 
transnational redistribution in Europe and I outline a way to test these. First, I expect citizens 
who hold a European identity rather than an exclusively national identity to support transnational 
redistribution. Second, I hypothesize that ideology mediates attitudes. An economically left 
ideology and a social libertarian ideology orientation are associated with higher support for 
transnational redistribution. Third, I posit that elite consensus increases support whereas salient 
! 9!
elite dissent decreases support for transnational redistribution. Finally, I expect citizens’ attitudes 
towards regional redistribution within a country to be a good predictor for their attitudes towards 
a similar process on the European scale. To test these hypotheses I outline a survey experiment 
which combines the features of a laboratory experiment with the advantages of a population 
based survey.
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PAPER 1: AMBIVALENT OR INDIFFERENT? RECONSIDERING THE STRUCTURE 
OF EU PUBLIC OPINION 
 
 
[Published in European Union Politics, 14.1 (2013): 23-45.] 
 
Introduction 
!
In studies of EU public opinion, the dependent variable is typically conceptualized as 
one-dimensional – i.e. as a continuum from low support to high support for the unification of 
Europe. This disguises a central aspect of belief systems, namely, that individual opinions are 
often simultaneously positive and negative. Rather than endorsing one side and refuting the 
other, many citizens embrace elements of both sides. In research on American public opinion, 
individuals with competing considerations relevant to one and the same object are considered 
ambivalent. This study has two goals. First, I suggest a measure that accounts for critical 
differences in attitudes towards the European Union. The measure distinguishes between 
indifference, ambivalence, and univalent views. Second, I propose and test a theoretical 
framework to explain ambivalence in public notions of the EU.4 
Recent work has shown that ambivalence is not only distinct from indifference, but has 
nontrivial implications for the processing of political information and preference formation. 
Attitudes marked by ambivalence are held with less certainty, are retrieved from memory with 
more difficulty and, overall, tend to be less stable over time (Huckfeldt and Sprague 2000, Zaller !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Boomgaarden et al. 2011 for a notable exception that emphasizes the multidimensionality of citizens’ attitudes 
towards European integration. However, the authors focus on the distinctiveness of different dimensions of support 
instead of ambivalence as an attitude property. Van Ingelgom (2012), on the other hand, concentrates on 
indifference rather than ambivalence in attitudes towards European integration. 
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1992). Most notably, attitudes characterized by ambivalence are more vulnerable to persuasion 
than one-sided views (Bassili 1996) and they are more likely to be driven by whatever 
considerations are momentarily salient, so that context and cues become more relevant (Lavine et 
al. 1998, Tourangeau et al. 1989). Thus, the extent of ambivalence among Europeans is relevant 
in order to understand public opinion towards European integration, the success of extreme right- 
or left wing parties in European Parliament elections or EU referendum campaigns (Taggart, 
1998, De Vries and Edwards 2009, Hobolt and Brouard 2011). Hobolt (2009), for instance, 
demonstrates in an elaborate framework how an individual’s level of support for European 
integration affects voting behavior in EU referendums. Consequently, better information on the 
structure of EU public opinion can extend our knowledge on other political processes. Evidence 
from the US would suggest that in contrast to individuals with univalent attitudes, EU citizens 
with ambivalent attitudes are more likely to be influenced by EU level events that garner high 
media attention or the arguments made by elites during EU related campaigns. 
In the next section, I conceptualize ambivalent attitudes vis-à-vis un-ambivalent opinions. 
Then, I present a theoretical argument that links cue availability and cue competition to 
individual level ambivalence in views of the EU. Using Eurobarometer data, I show that the 
availability of cognitive cues on the EU increases ambivalence while decreasing indifference. 
Competing elite cues also intensify ambivalence and diminish levels of public indifference. On 
the contrary, affective cues reduce both levels of indifference and ambivalence among EU 
citizens. The results, for instance, elucidate a sharp difference between those who view the EU 
positively and those who are ambivalent, for it is the ambivalent that have a weak emotional 
involvement with the community. I conclude that the often-cited idea of a public dissensus on 
European integration is correct (Hooghe and Marks 2009), but needs revision. Rather than 
! 12!
describing only the aggregate level, a dissensus is what a significant share of Europeans 
experience on an individual level when forming their opinions about the EU. I address the 
theoretical implications of this finding and avenues for future research in a final section. 
 
 
Mapping Ambivalence and its Consequences !
 There are two conceptualizations of ambivalence in the literature: First, ambivalence as a 
conflict of core beliefs, and, second, as a coexistence of positive and negative evaluations on a 
single object. According to the first understanding, citizens are only considered ambivalent when 
their answers on a policy question are instable due to a conflict of their core beliefs. Alvarez and 
Brehm (1995) give the example of a woman who exhibits ambivalence in her attitude towards 
abortion policies due to the strong beliefs she holds for both women’s rights as well as respect 
for human life.  
Most research in political science employs a broader notion of ambivalence that is rooted 
in social psychology (Zaller 1992, Lavine 2001). According to this broader notion, ambivalence 
is the simultaneous endorsement of positive and negative evaluations with respect to an issue or 
object. Steenbergen and Brewer (2004) reconcile the two approaches and note that a conflict of 
core beliefs is a particular manifestation of ambivalence. I follow the broader notion of the 
concept, so that ambivalence is the presence of positive and negative considerations for the EU, 
while indifference is characterized by the absence of both kinds of considerations. A two-
dimensional space clearly maps the viewpoint of ambivalent Europeans (Cacioppo, Gardner, and 
Bernston 1997) and shows their conceptual distinctiveness from individuals who are indifferent 
about the EU. 
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Table 1: Two dimensional representation of attitudes towards the EU 
 Absence of unfavorable 
thoughts on EU 
Presence of unfavorable 
thoughts on EU 
Absence of favorable 
thoughts on EU indifferent  negative about EU 
Presence of favorable 
thoughts on EU positive about EU ambivalent !
The effects of attitudinal ambivalence are well documented in the American context. 
However, in the European context little is known about ambivalence. Ambivalence, for instance, 
has repeatedly been found to decrease the predictability of political attitudes (for an overview, 
see Steenbergen and Brewer 2004). This is closely linked to an ambivalent respondent’s greater 
difficulty in making a political choice. Also, ambivalence increases an individual’s dependence 
on information that is salient at a specific point in time. Alvarez and Brehm examine these 
effects of ambivalence on US citizens’ positions towards abortion policies (1995) and the 
American Internal Revenue Service (2002). Rudolph (2005) explores an increase in response 
variability among ambivalent respondents in regard to US campaign financing, demonstrating 
how group attachment mutes this effect. Basinger and Lavine (2005) explain low predictability 
of voting behavior with ambivalence in party identification. They demonstrate that ambivalence 
affects the cues citizens use to make their choice in elections. Economic voting, for instance, 
becomes more central in the decision making process of citizens who have an ambivalent party 
affiliation, lack political knowledge, and see little campaign stimulus. Lavine et al. (1998) find 
experimental evidence for the greater importance of temporarily salient information for 
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ambivalent respondents. Since one’s immediate environment or context is usually most salient, 
they are able to demonstrate ambivalent individuals’ greater susceptibility to contextual effects.5 
 
 
Sources of Ambivalence !
 The public opinion literature provides diverse and, at times, contradictory explanations of 
ambivalence. Addressing this literature, I develop a theoretical framework that explains 
ambivalence as a dimension of EU public opinion. At the center of my framework is a theory of 
cognitive and affective cues. Cognitive cues on the EU involve EU specific knowledge, political 
cues from the news media, and cues on the EU sent by parties. On the other hand, feelings of 
attachment to Europe and trust in EU institutions are treated as affective cues. These cues 
influence citizens’ views of the EU in a distinct but similar fashion to cognitive cues.  
To develop my framework, I built on approaches proposed by Zaller (1992) as well as 
Steenbergen and De Vries (2012).6 However, these authors primarily focus on cognitive cues.  
Since it is a well-established observation in social psychology that attitudes are driven both by 
cognitive assessments as well as affect (Breckler and Wiggins 1989), I extend existing 
explanations of ambivalence to include affective sources. I present the cognitive cue centered 
approaches by Zaller (1992) as well as Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) in the next sections 
before addressing affective cues. 
Zaller’s (1992) model on the relation between cognitive cues and political attitudes 
differentiates between three types of individuals: politically sophisticated citizens, politically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For a more thorough treatment of the human decision making process, see for example Lau (2003), Taber (2003), 
as well as Fiske and Taylor (2010). 
 
6 The authors provide an advance copy of their manuscript online at 
http://catherinedevries.eu/content/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=13&Itemid=28 
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unsophisticated citizens, and citizens in between those poles, who make up the majority of the 
population. Political sophistication refers to the level of attention citizens pay to politics and the 
extent to which they comprehend political information. Thus, the concept of political 
sophistication is about the degree to which citizens absorb political cues.  Zaller (1992) shows 
that individuals with low political sophistication are unlikely to be ambivalent about political 
issues due to their inattention to politics and lack of knowledge about competing political cues. 
Politically sophisticated citizens are also low in ambivalence, although for different reasons. 
Zaller (1992) notes that very politically sophisticated citizens are able to assess and reject 
counter attitudinal messages right away and are thus driven by a coherent set of considerations. 
He theorizes that all other citizens are expected to be ambivalent. That is because most citizens 
somewhat follow political news and have some political skills, but are not able to reject all 
political cues in opposition with their own views. These citizens accept and store numerous 
competing considerations on political issues, which makes ambivalence more likely to occur. 
The account offered by Zaller (1992) is tailored to the political environment in the United 
States, especially its two party system. In most European countries, more than two political 
parties send cues on European integration. Except for cues from extreme right wing parties, 
political cues are often not aimed for or against the EU, but show more subtle differences. Like 
Zaller (1992), Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) conceptualize public opinion as a cueing process 
in which citizens rely on cues to form opinions. However, Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) 
factor in the specificities of European public opinion formation. For instance, they examine the 
effect of different cognitive cues separately, such as EU knowledge, news media cues on the EU, 
and party dissent on European integration. In contrast to Zaller (2012), the authors find that 
regardless of the level of political sophistication, competing cues always lead to ambivalence. By 
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the same token, they argue that “the clearer the cues are, the better able will the person be to 
form a coherent attitude and the less variable his or her expressed opinions will be” (Steenbergen 
and De Vries 2012: 6). 
Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) thus do not find that politically sophisticated citizens – 
i.e. those with considerable knowledge about the EU – are less ambivalent because they are able 
to reject competing cues. On the contrary, there is evidence for a positive relationship between 
cognitive cue availability and ambivalence. Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) find that greater 
EU news media salience increases response variation, their indicator of ambivalence. This 
supports the notion that an increased emphasis on the EU by news media brings about a surge in 
the provision of competing cues, which, in turn, contributes to public ambivalence. Steenbergen 
and De Vries (2012) conclude that the salience of dissonant cognitive cues is an important 
trigger of ambivalence. 
  In contrast to Steenbergen and De Vries (2012), I argue that the lowest levels of political 
sophistication and a complete lack of cues on the EU cause indifference rather than ambivalence. 
An individual lacking any sort of cues is unlikely to be torn between two sides regarding the EU. 
Additionally, I hypothesize that cognitive cue availability decreases the prevalence of univalent 
views on the EU and increases ambivalence regarding the EU. On the one hand, I expect that 
cognitive cues make seeing the EU in a positive view less likely, and in turn, ambivalence more 
widespread. I expect this because acquiring cognitive cues causes citizens to hold an abundance 
of cues that might often be in opposition with each other. On the other hand, the literature 
provides much evidence that a better understanding of European integration makes a negative 
view of the EU less common (Inglehart 1970, Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif 1987, Janssen 1991). 
To summarize, I note the first hypothesis: 
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H 1: Cognitive cues decrease indifference and increase ambivalence about the EU. 
 
Another important source of cognitive cues regarding the EU are political parties since 
politics of European integration are often very technical in nature and the implications of many 
policies for an individual’s personal life can be difficult to assess (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 
1994, Ray 2003). Elites provide cognitive cues that assist the public in making sense of 
European integration. If elites are divided over European integration, these cues are likely to be 
in competition with one another. 
Steenbergen and de Vries (2012) theorize that both small and large levels of 
differentiation among party stances towards European integration lead to ambivalence. On the 
one hand, they argue that agreement translates into little need for debate and a lack of cues, 
which in turn intensifies ambivalence. On the other hand, large differences between parties 
regarding European integration also cause ambivalence because of the dissemination of 
competing cognitive cues.  
In line with Steenbergen and De Vries (2012), I also expect elite division to translate into 
a salient political debate making competing cues on the EU available and leading to increased 
ambivalence. Along the same lines, I expect party dissent on European integration to decrease 
univalently positive views of EU. To date, party consent on European integration expresses an 
elite consent pro European integration, making positive views of the EU more likely. If there is 
dissent among parties, it reflects that one or more parties deviate from the elite consent in favor 
of the EU, which, in turn, makes positive views less likely to occur. In contrast to Steenbergen 
and De Vries (2012), I argue that a lack of contestation is not connected to higher levels of 
ambivalence. I expect elite consent to contribute to higher levels of indifference, rather than 
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ambivalence, since cue availability and cue competition is likely to be very low in the absence of 
a debate among parties over European integration.  
H 2: Greater party differentiation on European integration leads to higher levels of ambivalence 
and elite consent to higher levels of indifference. 
 
 As mentioned before, social psychology highlights that attitudes are driven by cognitive 
assessments as well as affect. In fact, evidence even suggests a supremacy of affect over 
cognition, particularly when cognitive cues are unavailable or inconclusive (Lavine et al. 1998a). 
Affective reactions can often be accessed more easily and more quickly than cognitive 
information (Zajonc 1984). In many instances, affective responses to an object are perceived as 
more subjectively valid and linked more closely to one’s self than cognitive cues (Lavine et al. 
1998a). Hence I extend the cognitive cue centered model to also include affective cues. I argue 
that the availability of affective cues is critical for citizens’ views of the EU. Among the different 
types of affect influencing public attitudes towards European integration, I focus on two key 
concepts, namely trust in EU institutions and attachment to Europe (McLaren 2004, McLaren 
2007, Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003, Karp and Bowler 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2004, 
2005). Both concepts express strong feelings and lead individuals to care about objects, which in 
turn decreases their level of indifference. Strong feelings are also likely to decrease the level of 
ambivalence, since affective cues can override a potential conflict of cognitive cues. 
I hence expect trust in EU institutions to decrease indifference and ambivalence about the 
EU. For instance, while politically sophisticated individuals who lack trust in EU institutions are 
likely to be among the most ambivalent individuals, those who do trust EU institutions are likely 
! 19!
to be much less ambivalent. In fact, since trust can override competing cognitive cues among 
highly sophisticated individuals, it should make them univalently positive about the EU.  
H 3: Trust in EU institutions leads to less indifference, less ambivalence and more positive views 
of the EU.  
 
Another important affective cue that structures public opinion towards European 
integration are group attachments. Rudolph (2005) provides a detailed theoretical account and 
empirical support for the notion that group attachments decrease ambivalence. He argues that 
feelings of affiliation with a group help individuals to organize complex political issues. Studies 
that have applied this finding to EU public opinion include Hooghe and Marks (2004, 2005), 
who argue that individuals attached to Europe and their nation support European integration at 
much higher levels than exclusive nationalists. Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) also find that a 
dual national and European identity decreases ambivalence in support for European integration. 
I expect a feeling of attachment to Europe to affect views of the EU in a similar way to 
trust in EU institutions. I expect attachment to Europe to decrease indifference and ambivalence. 
Since attachment to Europe is a positive affect, I expect attachment to decrease the likelihood for 
citizens to hold a negative view on the EU. Further, I hypothesize individuals at any level of 
political sophistication and cognitive cue availability to be less ambivalent about the EU. 
Subsequently, citizens who are knowledgeable about the EU and lack an affective attachment to 
Europe are expected to be ambivalent. Individuals who are knowledgeable about the EU and also 
have a strong affective attachment are expected to have a positive view of the EU. 
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H 4: Attachment to Europe decreases levels of indifference, negative views of the EU and 
ambivalence while making citizens more likely to hold a positive view on the EU. 
 
 
Data, Measurement, and Model !
 The data for the empirical analysis and hypothesis tests come from Eurobaromter wave 
63.4, for which the fieldwork took place between May and June 2005. It includes data from 
representative samples of around 1000 individuals from all countries that were EU member 
states at the time. This data set offers a unique combination of question items. It is one of the few 
survey waves that not only asks respondents about their position on the EU membership of their 
country, but also asks how attached respondents are to Europe, if they trust EU institutions, how 
much they know about them, and what meaning the EU has for them personally. The latter 
question provides the basis for my measurement of ambivalence and indifference. 
 
Dependent Variable 
For psychologists ambivalence is a well-known attitude dimension, which is typically 
accounted for by using two separate measures to gauge an individual’s relationship to an attitude 
object (Cacioppo, Garner, and Berntson 1997). By measuring how much someone likes an object 
independently from how much someone dislikes the same object, one can differentiate between 
indifference (neither liking, nor disliking), a positive attitude (liking, but no disliking), a negative 
attitude (disliking, but no liking), and ambivalence (simultaneous liking and disliking). Authors 
in American political science literature rely on items in the American National Election Study 
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(ANES) that tap on the number of favorable and unfavorable things a respondent mentions about 
a particular candidate.  
European surveys such as the Eurobarometer or European Election Study lack similar 
items. Steenbergen and de Vries (2012) circumvent this problem by considering the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in a regression model as an indication of ambivalence. Heteroskedasticity 
indicates unequal error variances, which can occur for reasons unrelated to ambivalence, such as 
an omitted variable or a model misspecification. Apart from that, heteroskedasticity refers only 
to a model as a whole, rather than to any observation individually. As a result, this measure 
neither allows an inference on the percentage of Europeans who are ambivalent, nor on which 
particular respondents are ambivalent. 
 I suggest a measure of ambivalence based on the meanings of the EU to respondents of a 
large-N survey. The Eurobarometer question “what does the European Union mean to you 
personally” provides information on whether a respondent views the EU in a positive way, a 
negative way or both positively and negatively. Each respondent is being offered thirteen 
meaning items that have a clearly positive or negative connotation. Seven items are positive 
(peace, economic prosperity, democracy, social protection, freedom to travel, cultural diversity, 
stronger say in the world) and six items are negative (unemployment, bureaucracy, waste of 
money, loss of cultural identity, more crime, not enough control at external frontiers).7 A 
respondent can answer that the EU means to her any one of these items or a combination of 
them, as there is no upper limit to how many items can be chosen. Only 5.7% of respondents 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 It would be preferable if the number of positive and negative items were the same. Since this cannot be changed, 
positive items have a greater probability of being chosen by a respondent. Thus, the figures for a positive view of the 
EU might be biased slightly upward, while those of a negative view can be biased downward. However, this is 
expected to have a negligible impact on the focus of the paper, which is ambivalence and indifference towards the 
EU. 
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mention none of these 13 options. The meaning selected most often is the freedom to travel, 
study, and work anywhere in the EU. It was selected by 53.5% of the participants of the survey. 
Among the negative meanings of the EU to respondents, the modal answer was bureaucracy, 
which was mentioned by 23.3% (more details on the pattern of the answers can be found in 
appendix B2).  
Based on their answers, respondents fall into one of four clearly distinguishable groups: 
(1) persons who attach none of the 13 labels to the EU, (2) respondents who attach both negative 
and positive meanings to the EU, (3) individuals for whom the EU only has positive meanings 
and (4) a group for whom the EU only has negative meanings. I code the first group as 
indifferent towards the EU. Following the conceptualization of ambivalence as a simultaneous 
presence of positive and negative considerations on an attitude object, I code group two as 
ambivalent towards the EU. The respondents in group three are considered to have positive 
views about the EU and the respondents in group four are coded as negative about the EU.8 
 Based on this operationalization, the distribution of the dependent variable looks as 
follows. The EU has an exclusively positive connotation for 38.6% of the respondents and an 
exclusively negative meaning for 14.7%. The total share of indifferent respondents is 5.7%, 
while 41.0% are ambivalent. For the majority of ambivalent respondents (58.9%), the EU has 
three or less positive meanings as well as three or less negative meanings (appendix B1 provides 
more details on how conflicted ambivalent respondents are). 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 To counter the argument that ambivalence might only be present if a respondent is torn between more than a single 
positive and negative consideration, I tested another coding. In another model (online appendix, Table 18), I coded 
respondents only as ambivalent if the EU has at least two positive and two negative meanings for her. This does not 
change the main pattern of the effects of cognitive and affective cues on indifference and ambivalence towards the 
EU. 
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Table 2: Cross tabulation of EU membership support and attitude structure 
 EU Membership of [country] is … 
 
 
 good thing neither/nor bad thing don’t know total 
 
indifferent 
3.1 
(401) 
6.8 
(509) 
6.4 
(215) 
33.9 
(285) 
5.7 
(1410) 
 
univalent 
negative 
4.7 
(619) 
18.9 
(1408) 
43.8 
(1482) 
17.5 
(147) 
14.7 
(3656) 
 
univalent 
positive 
52.6 
(6904) 
27.6 
(2057) 
12.2 
(414) 
24.0 
(202) 
38.6 
(9577) 
 
 
ambivalent 
39.6 
(5194) 
46.7 
(3485) 
37.6 
(1272) 
24.6 
(207) 
41.0 
(10,158) 
 
Total 
100.00 
(13,118) 
100.00 
(7459) 
100.00 
(3383) 
100.00 
(841) 
100 
(24,801) 
All figures are percentages; absolute numbers in parentheses. 
 
 Table 2 presents a cross tabulation of the popular EU membership question (“Do you 
support the EU membership of [your country]?”) and the four categories of my dependent 
variable. It reveals that the EU membership question would be an imprecise measure for 
differentiating between citizens with univalent and ambivalent views of the EU. There are 
respondents that associate the EU with positive and negative characteristics in each of the EU 
membership answer categories: i.e. among those saying EU membership is “a good thing”, “a 
bad thing”, “neither/nor”, or “don’t know”. For instance, 37.6 percent of respondents who find 
the EU membership of their country a bad thing are ambivalent, as well as almost 40 percent of 
those who find it a good thing. It is also noteworthy that nearly 50% of the respondents who 
selected the “neither/nor” category on the EU membership question actually have a one sided 
view on the EU (18.9% are negative and 27.6% are positive). 
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Independent Variables 
Political sophistication is supposed to capture cognitive cue availability on the EU. It has 
a prominent role in explaining support for European integration and is operationalized in various 
ways in the literature. Inglehart’s early contribution emphasizes the focal point of the concept, 
namely an individual’s political skills (Inglehart 1970). He measures political skills using 
education and objective knowledge questions. American public opinion literature employs 
objective knowledge questions on political issues as a primary measurement instrument (Zaller 
1992, Dancey and Goren 2010). I use objective knowledge to capture political sophistication. 
Objective knowledge is tapped by four EU related knowledge questions and has the highest 
value when a respondent answers all questions correctly. Additionally, cue availability on the EU 
and sophistication is higher among citizens who regularly consume news media (De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden 2006). Hence, I include a variable for news media consumption. The variable is an 
index based on the frequency with which an individual attends to news on television, on the 
radio, and in newspapers. 
The second hypothesis addresses the effect of party dissensus on European integration. 
Party dissensus is operationalized using a measure of dispersion. I calculate a mean EU 
orientation score for each country based on all parties in each member state and use the standard 
deviations on this mean for a regression analysis. The standard deviation sums up in one figure 
the dissimilarity of party positions on European integration within each EU country. The Chapel 
Hill expert survey (Hooghe et al. 2010) provides data on party positions, including party 
positioning on European integration. I use the survey version closest to Eurobarometer wave 
63.4, i.e. the survey from 2006. In the expert survey data, each party is placed on a scale from 
one (strongly opposed to European integration) to seven (strongly in favor). The scores from 
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each party are used to calculate country means as well as a standard deviation for each EU 
member state. Smaller numbers of the standard deviation indicate relative consensus. This data is 
not available for Cyprus, Malta, or Luxembourg. These countries will be excluded from the 
analysis. 
In my model, feelings of trust and attachment are treated as affective cues. I 
operationalize these affective measures using items from the Eurobarometer data set, which 
offers question items that measure trust in the European Parliament, the European Commission, 
the Council of the EU, and in the Court of Justice. The four items have been combined in an 
additive index. The data set does not offer a measure tapping identities, which would have 
allowed me to construct an exclusive/inclusive or dual identity variable as used in previous 
studies (Hooghe and Marks 2005, Steenbergen and De Vries 2012). To capture a person’s 
feelings of closeness to Europe, I use a question item that asks respondents how attached they are 
to Europe with the four response categories “not at all attached”, “not very attached”, “fairly 
attached”, and “very attached”.9 
 
Control Variables 
 Isolating the effect of cognitive and affective cues on ambivalence in regard to someone’s 
views of the EU requires controlling for confounding factors. My model is concerned with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Affective cues are measured with items explicitly gauging a respondent’s feelings. The dependent variable is solely 
measured on the basis of cognitions, namely the meanings a respondent associates the EU with. This ensures that 
both instruments measure distinct concepts. Nevertheless, I cannot rule out the possibility that a citizens’ level of 
trust in EU institutions is in part driven by her attitude towards the EU. My conceptualization reflects the notion that 
feelings are more quickly accessible than cognitions (Zajonc 1984), from which it would follow that affective cues 
are causally prior to an attitudinal stance on the EU (based on cognitions). This mirrors the dominant understanding 
in the EU public opinion literature according to which trust in EU institutions as well as an attachment to Europe are 
predictors for a citizens’ attitude towards the EU rather than results of it  (Carey 2002, Hooghe and Marks 2005, 
McLaren 2007). 
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ambivalence and indifference, but it also includes the response categories of a positive and 
negative notion of the EU. Therefore, I follow the suggestion of Steenbergen and De Vries 
(2012) regarding the selection of control variables. In their heteroskedastic regression model, 
they predict univalent and ambivalent attitudes towards the unification of Europe and apply 
controls derived from the rich literature of public support for European integration.  
 At the country level, I use net fiscal transfer and membership length (in decades) as 
control variables. Individuals who live in EU member states that receive funds from the EU 
budget have been found to be more positive about European integration than citizens in member 
states that are net-contributors (Anderson and Reichert 1995). Steenbergen and De Vries (2012) 
associate response variation in support for the unification of Europe with EU membership length.  
 Economic models of public opinion on European integration suggest that individuals for 
whom the EU entails more opportunities are more likely to be supporters of the integration 
process (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998). While the EU provides benefits like the free 
movement of labor and capital to managers, professionals, and wealthy citizens, it involves more 
risks for other citizens, such as low skilled workers. I control for occupational skills by using 
dummy variables and calculating an index of possessions as an instrument to capture wealth and 
income. Additionally, Hooghe and Marks (2005) emphasize that subjective economic prospects 
matter and they differentiate between prospects for oneself and for one’s country. I control for 
(subjective) national economic prospects and personal economic prospects. 
Political orientations play a role for citizens’ attitudes towards European integration (Ray, 
2003, Steenbergen, Edwards, and De Vries 2007). However, this link is not straight forward, 
especially in a model that pools countries from Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. Rather 
than an alignment of Euroskepticism with one political side, the evidence seems to suggest that it 
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is extreme political positions (on either side) that go along with anti-European positions among 
parties (Marks et al. 2006). Thus, I use dummies for political orientation, which could capture 
this kind of alignment. Besides, individuals with extreme left or extreme right political 
orientations could generally be less ambivalent about politics, which is controlled for through the 
use of dummies. Almost 20% of the respondents did not report a political orientation. To keep 
such observations in my analysis, I use a dummy for these individuals as well. I add standard 
controls from the literature on EU support, namely age, gender, frequency of political 
discussions, and education. !!  
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Table 3: Means of key independent variables in the four categories of the dependent variable 
 
variable 
 
Indifferent 
 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Ambivalent 
EU knowledge 
(1-4) 
 
1.00 
(1.11) 
1.56 
(1.14) 
1.89 
(1.17) 
1.90 
(1.15) 
Education 
(1-10) 
 
3.74 
(2.87) 
4.36 
(2.78) 
5.73 
(3.04) 
5.82 
(2.94) 
News media 
consumption 
(0-1) 
 
.62 
(.27) 
.71 
(.24) 
.71 
(.23) 
.75 
(.22) 
Trust in EU 
institutions 
(0-8) 
 
3.96 
(2.52) 
2.94 
(2.90) 
6.10 
(2.46) 
4.96 
(2.83) 
EU attachment 
(1-4) 
 
2.50 
(.98) 
2.42 
(.95) 
2.98 
(.83) 
2.82 
(.85) 
Discuss politics 
(1-4) 
 
3.10 
(.97) 
2.75 
(1.00) 
2.60 
(.97) 
2.59 
(.96) 
Pol. left-right 
orientation 
(1-10) 
 
5.17 
(2.19) 
5.29 
(2.23) 
5.36 
(2.17) 
5.36 
(2.04) 
Age 
(15-97) 
 
54.40 
(20.03) 
51.49 
(17.76) 
45.21 
(18.54) 
46.7 
(17.31) 
Possessions 
(0-6) 
2.71 
(1.80) 
3.25 
(1.85) 
3.77 
(1.86) 
4.15 
(1.76) !
 
Summary Statistics 
The statistics in Table 3 reveal the salient features of the individuals in the four different 
categories of the dependent variable. The Table demonstrates that ambivalent Europeans tend to 
be more similar to those holding a positive view of the EU than to any other group. Ambivalent 
respondents and those with a positive view of the EU are characterized, for instance, by a higher 
knowledge on the EU than individuals with negative views on the EU or those who are 
indifferent. However, ambivalent respondents are distinct from those with a positive view of the 
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EU in terms of affective measures. On average, ambivalent citizens are less attached to Europe 
and less trustful of EU institutions than their peers who have a positive view of the EU. 
Indifferent respondents are different from both ambivalent and positive respondents. Instead, 
indifferent respondents are closer to those with a negative view on the EU, but generally have 
less knowledge on the EU and consume less news. 
Method 
 The data for this analysis is structured in two levels, with individuals being nested within 
countries. Respondents are likely to be more similar within countries than across countries, 
which can bias standard errors. Several independent variables vary only at the country level. I 
use a multilevel model in order to get correct standard errors for both individual and country 
level predictors. Because of the unordered character of the dependent variable, I estimate a 
multilevel multinomial logit regression model using Stata’s gllamm routine. 
 
 
Results !
The results reveal an important difference between indifference and ambivalence towards 
the EU. Cognitive cues decrease indifference, but increase ambivalence. The availability of 
cognitive cues makes a univalent view of the EU less likely. Affective cues decrease both levels 
of indifference and ambivalence. A strong positive affect towards the EU makes individuals 
more likely to be univalently positive about the EU.10 To examine these patterns in detail, I first 
comment on the raw coefficients of the multinomial logit model displayed in Table 4. Then, I 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!The VIF scores for all independent-level variables are below 2, indicating that multicollinearity is not a critical 
issue. The exact figures can be found in the appendix. 
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turn to predictive probabilities as a more accessible way to interpret the substantive meaning of 
the findings.  
The estimated model explains a significant share of variance in the dependent variable.11 
The coefficients in Table 4 refer to a change in the probability that a respondent is in one of the 
response categories rather than in the reference group, namely ambivalence towards the EU. All 
independent predictors except the dummy variables are standardized and hierarchically centered. 
Thus, the coefficients refer to the effect of a standard deviation increase of an independent 
variable while all other variables are held at their means. For instance, the negative coefficients 
for elite division indicate that an increase in elite division makes it less likely for a respondent to 
be negative, positive, or indifferent about the EU and more likely for a respondent to be 
ambivalent. Specifically, a one-unit increase in elite division on the EU significantly decreases 
the logistic probability of a respondent being positive about the EU rather than ambivalent by .16 
(second column, Table 4) and by .38 for someone to be ambivalent rather than indifferent (third 
column, Table 4). Hence, this perspective shows whether the gap between an individual being in 
a respective rather than a reference category increases or decreases. It does not reveal how an 
increase in an independent variable affects a respondents’ (absolute) probability of being in a 
response category.12 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 This is confirmed by a likelihood ratio test. The deviance of an intercept only model is 46521.934, while the 
deviance of the full model is 42115.402. 
 12!The coefficients themselves do not show whether a variable makes an individual more or less likely to be  
in one of the four categories of the dependent variable. See Borooah (2002: 51) on this point: “…the  
direction of change in Pr (Yi=m) the probability of observing outcome j=m, for a small change in Xir cannot be 
inferred from the sign of β. The reason is that in a multinomial a change in the value of a variable for a particular 
person affects for him or her the probability for every outcome (…). Therefore in effect it depends not just upon the 
sign of β but also upon the size of that coefficient relative to the size of the other coefficients attached to the 
variable…”. 
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Predicted probabilities show how an increase in an independent variable affects the 
probability for an individual to fall into one of the four categories of the dependent variable. This 
perspective puts the regression output on a more meaningful scale and therefore offers a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the effects. Table 5 presents the predicted probabilities that an 
individual will fall into each of the response categories based on the results from the model 
displayed in Table 4. For a more intuitive interpretation of the results, I show the marginal effect 
of a two standard deviation increase in each of the key independent variables. The figures in 
Table 5 reveal the change in the predicted probabilities resulting from an increase in an 
independent variable from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation 
above the mean when all other variables are held at their means or reference categories. Figures 
1 and 2 provide a graphic representation of these effects. The lines on each dot in these figures 
represent a 95% confidence interval of the effects.13 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The effects are statistically significant when the 95% confidence interval does not include zero. 
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Cognitive cues and the difference between ambivalence and indifference 
The results from my analysis confirm hypothesis one. Cognitive cues significantly 
decrease levels of indifference and increase ambivalence about the EU. Figure 1 shows how the 
effects of EU knowledge, news media consumption, and elite division on indifference and 
ambivalence support this conclusion. 
The figures in Table 5 reveal that the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase 
in EU knowledge is a decrease in the predicted probability that a respondent is indifferent about 
the EU by 55.8%. In contrast, EU knowledge increases the probability that a respondent is 
ambivalent about the EU by 7.5%. Cognitive cues from the news media have an analogous 
effect. A two standard deviation increase in news media consumption results in a drop of the 
probability for someone to be indifferent by 24.3 percent. The effect on the probability for a 
respondent to be ambivalent is an increase by 6.7 percent. Additionally, news media 
consumption makes respondents less likely to be positive about the EU. The same increase in 
news media consumption decreases the predicted probability for someone to be positive about 
the EU by 4.5 percent. 
The results suggest that cognitive cue availability makes it difficult for Europeans to be 
indifferent towards the EU. However, this opinion does not necessarily need to be one sided. 
Rather, EU knowledge and news media consumption seem to provide EU citizens with cues that 
allow them to view the supranational institution from two different perspectives, a positive and a 
negative one.  The data does not support a curvilinear relationship between cue availability and 
ambivalence.14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 In order to test for this possibility, I included squared terms of key independent variables in another version of the 
regression model (not displayed). This did not yield significant effects. 
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Figure 1: Predicted probabilities showing the effect of cognitive cues 
Note: Effect of a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean of 
three independent variables of interest on the predicted probabilities that a respondent is in each of the categories 
when all other variables are held at their means. The lines indicate the 95 % confidence interval. 
 
The effect of elite division emphasizes the fundamental difference between indifference 
and ambivalence. Figure 1 reveals that party dissent over European integration significantly 
decreases levels of indifference and positive views of the EU, while augmenting levels of 
ambivalence. The predicted probability changes in Table 5 show that a two standard deviation 
increase in elite division decreases the probability that a respondent is indifferent about the EU 
by 45.8%. Elite division also increases the probability of an individual being ambivalent by 
16.5%. In countries in which party positions on European integration are more differentiated, the 
probability of a respondent having a positive view of the EU decreases. The theoretical 
!
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expectation is that differences in party positions translate into a political debate. First, this is 
presumed to make it easier for citizens to form an opinion on the EU, making indifference less 
prevalent. Second, party dissent on European integration is assumed to provide individuals with 
competing cues and is therefore linked to higher levels of ambivalence and lower levels of 
univalent views on the EU. The analysis supports both explanations, although elite division is 
apparently more powerful in decreasing indifference than in increasing ambivalence. 
In a nutshell, indifference results from a lack of cognitive cues on the EU. Ambivalence 
appears to result from an abundance of cognitive cues and their conflict with each other. The 
availability of cognitive cues also makes individuals significantly less likely to have univalent 
views of the EU. This analysis examined three sources of such cues, namely EU specific 
knowledge, the news media, and elites. News media consumption and elite division both lead to 
lower levels of univalently positive views on the EU. This is in line with my theoretical 
expectation because both the news media and elites, when divided, are likely to provide 
conflicting cues on the EU to citizens. These results also have an interesting implication for the 
role of party politicization of EU politics, as politicization apparently increases the involvement 
of citizens. At the same time, however, politicization might not necessarily increase the public 
approval of European integration but spread ambivalence instead. 
 
 
The effect of affective cues 
Affective cues, quite in contrast to cognitive cues, decrease not only levels of 
indifference but also levels of ambivalence. The affective cues I focus on measure the extent of 
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an individual’s positive affect towards the EU, namely trust in EU institutions and attachment to 
the EU. These types of positive affect also decrease negative views of the EU. Specifically, 
positive affect is the strongest predictor for a univalently positive view of the EU. 
Hypothesis three states that trust in EU institutions decreases indifference and 
ambivalence, while it increases positive views of the EU. The results confirm this expectation. 
Figure 2 reveals that the marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in trust in EU 
institutions decreases the probability for a respondent to be indifferent about the EU by 44.7 
percent. Furthermore, the same increase in trust also significantly reduces the probability of a 
respondent to be ambivalent about the EU by 10.8 percent.  
Trust in EU institutions also has a strong effect on univalent views of the EU. 
Specifically, it is a strong predictor for a positive view of the EU. A two standard deviation 
increase in trust results in a 69.4 percent reduction in the probability for an individual to hold a 
negative view of the EU and an almost 90 percent increase in the probability for a positive view. 
In a nutshell, trust in EU institutions makes individuals less negative about the EU, less 
indifferent, and also less ambivalent. In turn, high trust in EU institutions is what differentiates 
individuals with a positive view of the EU from all other respondents. 
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities showing the effect of affective cues. 
Note: Effect of a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean of 
two independent variables on the predicted probabilities that a respondent is in each of the categories when all other 
variables are held at their means. The lines indicate the 95 % confidence interval. 
 
Attachment to Europe provides another affective cue that decreases levels of indifference 
and ambivalence. It also makes respondents less likely to have a negative view of the EU and 
much more likely to see the EU positively. Hypothesis four can be confirmed. Figure 2 reveals 
the similarity of the effect of attachment to Europe with that of trust in EU institutions. The 
marginal effect of a two standard deviation increase in EU attachment is a drop of the predicted 
probability for a respondent to be indifferent by 19 percent as well as a reduction of the 
probability for an individual to be ambivalent by almost four percent. Attachment to Europe 
measures a positive affect towards the EU. Parallel to the effect of trust, higher levels of 
attachment are associated with a lower probability for a respondent to view the EU negatively 
!
!!!
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and a higher probability for a respondent to be positive about it. 
The effect of both types of affective cues points to the same conclusion. In particular, 
attachment to the EU and trust in EU institutions helps to better understand the difference 
between ambivalent respondents and those with a positive view of the EU. Both of these groups 
of individuals know more about the EU than citizens who are indifferent or negative about it. 
However, these individuals differ substantively in their level of affect for the EU. In a nutshell, 
politically sophisticated citizens who trust EU institutions and are very much attached to Europe 
tend to have a positive view of the EU, while those who lack such an emotional involvement 
tend to be ambivalent. 
 
Conclusion !
 A growing body of literature casts doubt on the assumption that citizens view political 
issues and objects in an exclusively positive or negative way. I suggest a measure that 
differentiates among indifference, univalent views, and ambivalence towards the EU using 
Eurobarometer data to catch a first glimpse of the extent of ambivalence present among 
Europeans. It shows that a sizeable number of Europeans are ambivalent. The analysis presents a 
framework that explains ambivalence on the basis of the availability and competition of 
cognitive and affective cues. The results reveal that cognitive cues, such as those stemming from 
EU knowledge and news media consumption intensify ambivalence towards the EU. In turn, 
cognitive cues decrease the probability for citizens to be positive or indifferent. Levels of 
indifference towards the EU are further diminished and levels of ambivalence are amplified 
when party positions on European integration differ greatly and competing cognitive cues 
become available to the public. Affective cues, by contrast, work in a different way. Trust in EU 
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institutions and an attachment to Europe reduce both indifference and ambivalence towards the 
EU.  
This suggests a critical distinction between ambivalence and indifference. Ambivalent 
Europeans are highly informed by the news media and knowledgeable about the EU, while 
indifference results from low levels of knowledge and little understanding of EU politics. 
Additionally, indifference is at least in part related to low levels of party dissent on European 
integration, while a strong politicization of European integration and a debate among parties 
increases the probability for individuals to be ambivalent. The analysis also uncovered a 
difference between two groups of respondents who share a comparatively high level of political 
sophistication, namely those who are ambivalent and those who are positive about the EU. 
Ambivalence is more widespread and univalently positive views are less prevalent where elites 
are divided over European integration. Additionally, a lack of affective cues sets ambivalent 
Europeans apart from those with an exclusively positive view. A positive affect towards the EU 
in particular is one of the strongest catalysts for a univalently positive stance on the EU. 
Apparently, affect can motivate a firm position. A lack thereof can leave knowledgeable citizens 
puzzled where to stand in regard to the EU.  
 The results relate directly to theories of support for European integration. The notion that 
public opinion on the EU is characterized by a dissensus rather than a permissive consensus is 
apparently correct (Hooghe and Marks 2009). However, the constraining dissensus is not one 
that manifests itself only at the aggregate level. Rather, future theorizing on the opinions of 
Europeans should recognize that dissensus on European integration exists in many citizens’ 
minds.  
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The findings of this study have implications for future research on public attitudes 
towards European integration. In order to develop a precise understanding of the role of 
ambivalence, we first need better information. I employ a measure for ambivalence that provides 
only the first insight into the extent of individuals for whom the EU has a simultaneously 
positive and negative connotation. Research in psychology uses more elaborate tools to capture 
ambivalence (Kaplan 1972, Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995, Cacioppo, Gardner, and 
Berntson 1997). The model presented in this paper can inform research analyzing how the Euro 
crisis affects EU public opinion. It underlines the importance of whether citizens perceive elites 
to be divided. Elite division over solutions to tackle the crisis could be a catalyst for rising levels 
of ambivalence towards the EU and a shrinking share of outright EU supporters. Given the 
significance of affective cues for attitudes towards the EU, it is also likely to be critical if the role 
of the EU in tackling the crisis contributes to higher or lower levels of trust in its institutions. A 
third route for future research is to analyze the behavioral consequences of ambivalence, for 
instance when it comes to national referendums on the EU or European Parliament elections. 
Ambivalent Europeans might be affected most by campaigns since they are more likely to 
change their opinions and use different heuristics when making voting decisions as compared to 
their unambivalent peers.  It could well be ambivalent EU citizens who tip the scale, for instance, 
in referendums on EU related issues. Two research questions in this context can be identified at 
once, namely how ambivalence affects turnout and whether ambivalent Europeans are in fact, as 
theory suggests, more easily affected by elite cues and flashy arguments. 
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PAPER 2: CONTACT AND COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
FOR A POLITICAL IDENTITY  
 
Introduction 
 
Can social interactions among individuals from different nations generate a sense of 
community that transcends national borders? For many citizens, their national identity is an 
important part of who they are. However, the role of nations is changing. Borders have become 
more permeable. Trade interdependence has increased, and social interactions now stretch 
beyond national borders. International integration has changed the role of national states in even 
more profound ways, particularly in Europe, where European countries have transferred 
considerable policy authority to a supranational organization. How do these processes affect 
citizens’ sense of community? This study tackles this issue by tracing the role of transnational 
social interactions in the formation of a new political community. The study applies a quasi-
experimental approach to show the constituting role of social interactions for a supranational 
collective identity in Europe. 
A rich literature in social psychology shows that interactions across group boundaries 
lessen prejudice, foster trust, and generate a collective identity among individuals from diverse 
ethnic or racial backgrounds. The role of social interactions in community building was central 
to Karl Deutsch’s thesis (Deutsch 1953, Deutsch et al. 1957). His early work inspired a recent 
debate on whether increased social interactions across borders facilitate a notion of political 
community among citizens of the EU. However, empirical tests have yielded inconclusive 
results. Research based on cross-sectional data suggests that social interactions generate a 
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collective political identity among Europeans (Fligstein 2008, Mitchell 2012, Rother and Nebe 
2009, Van Mol 2013). Recent panel studies, which are arguably better equipped to examine 
causal processes, reject the same idea (Sigalas 2010, Wilson 2011). These contrasting results are 
puzzling, especially in light of a vast literature in social psychology on the effect of contact 
(Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). 
My approach differs from previous studies in two ways. First, I apply insights from social 
psychology to theorize the microfoundations of the contact hypothesis. This enables me to 
specify the exact conditions under which social interactions lead (or do not lead) to identity 
building. Second, I use a unique three-wave panel data set to probe causal effects more robustly 
than previous studies. I surveyed almost 1500 students at 38 German universities before they left 
their home institutions to study one or two terms in another European country, shortly after they 
returned, and a third time after a time lag of five months. I use a refined measure to gauge 
identities that is superior to items in cross sectional surveys. Also, the length of my panel survey 
– 18 months – is unusual and enables me to probe more deeply into the stability of identity 
change. Thus, even though the set of respondents is not a random sample from the population, 
the panel study design with control group allows establishing causal effects more reliably than 
research based on cross sectional survey data, because the effect of social interactions can be 
observed within individuals and over time.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the first part, I draw on Deutsch’s transactionalist 
framework, the contact hypothesis, and the common in-group identity model developed in social 
psychology to propose a more refined theory of the effect of social interactions. Next, I present 
evidence suggesting that transnational social interactions contribute to a sense of community 
among Europeans. Using data on participants’ interactions with other international students and 
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peers from their host country, I further analyze the underlying causal process. My findings 
suggest that it is contact with other international students that fosters a collective European 
identity, while interactions with hosts do not have a similar result. In a final step, I examine if a 
pronounced European identity among those who went abroad is only short-lived and tenuous, 
and find suggestive evidence for a stable recalibration of political identities.   
 
Contact and Collective Identities 
 
In political science, Karl Deutsch’s influential work first carved out the relevance of social 
interactions for political communities. The interaction hypothesis was devised in “Nationalism 
and Social Communication,” which deals with relations among individuals within a state 
(Deutsch 1953). The central theme is that social mobilization, mutual understanding, and 
effective communication are constitutive for the cohesion of a nation. Later, Deutsch and 
colleagues developed a similar idea in the realm of international politics (Deutsch et al. 1957), 
though geared towards the role of transactions for a “security community” made up of different 
nations. Deutsch’s work had major implications for the understanding of regional integration and 
sparked a vivid interest in the role of social interactions for the emergence of a collective identity 
among Europeans. However, his groundbreaking studies are not concerned with the underlying 
process at the individual level. 
Research in social psychology focuses extensively on the effects and individual level 
underpinnings of social interactions. Contact theory, which has its roots in studies on racism in 
the United States, postulates that contact situations, which fulfill certain properties, foster 
positive attitudes of individuals from different groups towards one another. Allport (1954) argues 
that a successful reduction of intergroup biases necessitates the interactive situation to exhibit 
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four properties: equal status among those in contact, cooperative interdependence, common 
goals, and support of shared authorities, laws, or customs. Over time, the list of conditions 
defining an optimal contact situation has been extended, most importantly, by the advantageous 
role of opportunities to form friendships across group boundaries (Pettigrew et al. 2011). 
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) review more than 500 studies on the effect of contact published 
within the last five decades. Their meta study reports remarkable empirical support for the 
contact hypothesis. What is more, the authors note that the effect of contact remains statistically 
observable as long as the intergroup contact situation is a positive rather than a negative 
experience. 
Contact theory explains the effect of positive interactions on intergroup biases, but it does 
not link social interactions to collective identities. The common in-group identity model, an 
extension of contact theory formulated in the 1990s, points specifically to collective identities as 
one reason why contact reduces intergroup biases (Gaertner et al. 1993, Gaertner et al. 1996, 
Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). Hence, it provides a direct link between social interactions and 
identities. The common in-group identity model rests on the notion of a hierarchical structure of 
social identities. Individuals can think of themselves as members of smaller and more exclusive 
subgroups, or, alternatively, as members of larger and more encompassing higher level groups. If 
individuals think of themselves as members of a smaller group, their sub-group identity is 
salient, while thinking of themselves as member of a more encompassing group means a 
superordinate identity is salient. Summarizing the central tenet of the common in-group identity 
model, Gaertner et al. (1993: 6) make the point that “if members of different groups are induced 
to conceive of themselves as a single group rather than two completely separate groups, attitudes 
toward former out-group members will become more positive through processes involving pro-
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ingroup bias”. However, a pronounced superordinate identity does not imply that individuals 
need to give up their subgroup identities, but that their membership in a common and 
superordinate group becomes more significant for themselves, a shared identity more salient and, 
in turn, more consequential for attitudes and behavior (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000: 48). 
The common in-group identity model suggests that the conditions under which contact is 
associated with a reduction of intergroup biases are in fact also stimuli for individuals from 
different groups to see themselves as a more encompassing single group. Cooperative 
interactions and an equal status while interacting make it more likely for individuals to expand 
their in-group to individuals who were previously considered part of the out-group. An increase 
in the salience of existing superordinate identities and shared goals further facilitate the notion of 
a shared group affiliation (Gaertner and Dovidio 2012). Contact under these conditions sets a 
series of cognitive and affective processes in motion, which decrease the perceived distance 
between individuals from different groups. On the cognitive side, contact involves learning about 
the other group, which undermines prejudice and enhances intercultural understanding. On the 
affective side, social interactions across groups reduce anxiety, foster familiarity, and create 
empathy with the former out-group. 
Evidence from everyday situations and political life supports the significant role that a 
more encompassing superordinate social identity can play. For instance, Nier et al. (2001) show 
that whites evaluate blacks who share a university identity more favorably. Levine et al. (2005) 
find that individuals are more likely to help a stranger in an emergency if they recognize a 
common social identity. Kane, Angote, and Levine (2005) discover that working groups are 
more likely to adopt a new idea from a newcomer who shares a superordinate identity. In 
political science, evidence from survey experiments shows that national identity in the US can 
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function as a common in-group for citizens who might otherwise be perceived as citizens of a 
different ethnicity or race as out-group (Transue 2007, Wright and Citrin 2011). Transue’s work 
(2007) also highlights significant implications for redistributive issues. He finds that a tax 
increase for minority education finds much less support among whites when their racial identity 
is primed, compared to when their national identity is salient. A racial prime makes whites see a 
tax increase through their subgroup glasses. Hence, citizens interpret it as transfer from their own 
racial group to another one, whereas a similar interpretation is much less salient in the national 
identity condition.  
 
European Identity as Collective In-Group !
Applying the logic from social psychology to an international political context helps pin 
down the precise mechanisms and conditions under which social interactions can contribute to a 
supranational collective identity. In this realm, national identities rather than racial identities 
create the most powerful divisions. The European context is particularly well suited for analysis. 
Employing the terminology of the common in-group identity model, national identities could be 
understood as subgroup identities, whereas a collective European identity is the corresponding 
superordinate and supranational identity (Mols and Weber 2013). The formation of a collective 
European identity has potentially profound political implications. A rich literature highlights a 
collective European identity as an important normative condition for authority transfers from the 
national to the supranational level and the legitimacy of the EU at large (Fuchs and Klingemann 
2011, Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Empirical studies find citizens’ identities to be a prime 
factor that constrains European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005, McLaren 2007). Holding 
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some type of European identity in addition to loyalty to the nation is associated with significantly 
higher support of European integration. 
In short, Europeans can think of themselves just in terms of their national (subgroup) 
identity, in which case citizens in other countries are more likely to be perceived as out-group. 
Alternatively, individuals might think of themselves as individuals who are both citizens of the 
EU and their nation. In this case, Europeans in other countries are more likely to be seen as 
common in-group. This portrayal of the relationship between national and European identity 
resonates with a rich empirical literature. In fact, prominent studies conceptualize a collective 
European identity as a category akin to national identity albeit at a level above the nation state 
and referring to a community whose fuzzy boundaries coincide with the EU (Bruter 2009, Diez 
Medrano and Gutierrez 2001, Fligstein 2008). These authors apply Tajfel’s definition (1981: 
255) of a social identity, as “that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership”.15  In this sense, holding a European 
identity consists of a cognitive component, i.e. the self-identification as citizen of Europe rather 
than just as citizen of a particular country, as well as an affective part, namely an emotional 
attachment to the community of Europeans.  
Despite the conceptual comparability of a collective European identity to national 
identities, authors recently emphasize important differences in its empirical manifestation 
(Castano 2004, Mols and Weber 2013, Risse 2010). The EU, just like a nation state, is an 
“imagined community” from the perspective of citizens (Anderson 1991). In order for it to be a 
relevant category for citizens to identify with it needs to be tangible. Quite in contrast to nations, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 One should note, however, that much of the literature on a collective European identity does not test implications 
of Tajfel’s social identity theory in a strict sense, as Mols and Weber (2013) point out in a careful review. 
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however, the EU lacks a psychological existence for most citizens (Risse 2010: 56). For many 
individuals, it is an abstract entity and associated with a remote international organization rather 
than a community of people. Besides, it lacks reification mechanisms of a similar potency as  
those that socialize and link citizens of nation states to one another. 
One might conceive of social interactions as an instrument for attaching a personal 
meaning to the abstract category of a collective European identity and turning it into a 
meaningful category. The question is whether it does. Cross-sectional research finds a consistent 
positive association between social interactions and European identity, but longitudinal analyses 
do not support this conclusion.  
Using Eurobarometer public opinion data, Fligstein (2008) shows that citizens who have 
a strong European identity tend to travel more frequently to other European countries, are more 
educated than their peers, and often work as managers or professionals. Hence, these citizens are 
embedded in a network of transnational interactions, and Fligstein attributes their European 
identity to these interactions. Rother and Nebe (2009) corroborate his findings. They surveyed 
EU citizens who moved from their home country to another EU member state to live and work 
there. The share of respondents who are very much attached to Europe is much higher among 
movers than among citizens who did not leave their home country.16 Evidence based on ex-post 
surveys of intra-European exchange students also suggests that contact among Europeans 
prompts a European identity (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003, Mitchell 2012, Van Mol 2013). 
These studies share a common limitation. Due to the cross sectional nature of the data, 
they cannot reliably establish the direction of causality. In fact, it is as plausible to assume that 
individuals with a strong European identity in the first place are eager to interact with other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Kuhn (2011) adds a more nuanced test of the interaction hypothesis, though focusing on citizens’ levels of support 
for EU membership as the dependent variable. She finds three measures of transnationalism to increase support for 
European integration: a transnational background, transnational practices, and transnational human capital.  
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Europeans, as it is to argue that these citizens’ frequent interactions cause a strong attachment to 
Europe as suggested by Deutsch. Since correlational data cannot solve this puzzle, scholars have 
recently turned to panel surveys.  
Studies employing a pre-post test design present ambiguous results, which cast doubt on 
the causal role of contact for a collective European identity. Wilson (2011) surveys students 
taking part in the European student exchange program “Erasmus” before and after embarking on 
their trip abroad. He does not find an increase in identification with Europe over the course of his 
panel. Sigalas (2010) also surveys students before and after going abroad. He shows that social 
interactions have a positive effect on identification with Europe (Sigalas 2010: 259.). Yet, when 
comparing data from before and after the study abroad, Sigalas registers no change in 
identification with Europe among British students who study abroad. 
These null findings for the interaction hypothesis in a context that seems conducive for 
the emergence of a European identity are astonishing in light of the powerful evidence on the 
effects of contact from social psychology. Kuhn (2012) argues that educational exchange 
programs are ineffective because they are “preaching to the converted”. Compared with other 
citizens, students comprise a group that is already very attached to Europe. Consequently, they 
might not develop a stronger European identity: a ceiling effect. This has implications for the 
present study: individuals with a pronounced European identity already before engaging in 
intense social interactions with other Europeans might be affected less by contact than their peers 
with a weaker European identity to begin with. 
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Social Interactions and Identity Formation: Conditions and Expectations 
 
 
My starting point is to conceive of Europe as an “imagined community”, which needs to 
be made tangible in order for it to be a relevant identification category (Anderson 1991, Castano 
2004, Risse 2010). Without personal interactions among Europeans, the meaning of a collective 
European identity relies on elite cues and impersonal identity markers: symbols on passports and 
flags. Contact between individuals from diverse European countries is different: it gives tangible 
content to what it means to be “European.” This, in short, creates a cognitive representation of an 
otherwise abstract category. Furthermore, contact can also add a strong affective connotation to 
the concept of a shared European identity, when transnational social interactions are remembered 
as particularly positive and exciting experience, or led to friendships. 
Based on this reasoning, I can formulate my first hypothesis. A context in which 
interacting individuals cooperate to solve problems collectively, in which they have an equal 
status, and in which they have the opportunity to form friendships across group boundaries 
should be favorable for the emergence of a collective identity. These features promote seeing 
similarities rather than differences even if individuals come from different countries. In those 
circumstances individuals are expected to consider each other increasingly as members of the 
common superordinate group rather than citizens of different nations. Hence, a shared European 
identity should become more perpetually accessible, which I hypothesize to manifest itself 
empirically in a more pronounced sense of identification with Europe. 
I do however have sharply different expectations with regard to types of social 
interactions study abroad students engage in. On the one hand are individuals who interact 
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primarily with individuals of their host country when abroad. On the other hand are individuals 
who interact primarily with individuals from a diverse set of European countries. My second 
hypothesis is that contact with a diverse set of individuals from different European countries 
fosters a European identity more directly than interactions between study abroad students and 
hosts, because the contact situation more accurately mirrors the diversity of individuals making 
up the community of Europeans.  
My third expectation focuses on the extent to which individuals already have a 
pronounced European identity before entering a contact situation. I hypothesize transnational 
social interactions to have a stronger effect on individuals for whom a European identity is a 
comparably less important part of their self before going abroad. Previous findings suggest that 
the effectiveness of contact depends not only on external conditions, but also on the 
configuration of the political identity with which individuals enter the contact situation. Sigalas 
(2010) and Kuhn (2012) expect a ceiling effect, whereby individuals who already have a strong 
European identity may not be affected by a study abroad. Transnational social interactions 
should be more formative for individuals who do not already have friends in other European 
countries and who lack intense contact with other Europeans. For them, the concept of a 
European identity – previously abstract or meaningless – may become a more relevant, tangible, 
and meaningful identity in the context of their new social interactions with individuals from 
other countries.  
Finally, I expect transnational social interactions to generate a lasting identity change. In 
short, my expectation is that social interactions attach a personal meaning to the concept of a 
European identity that persists outside of the contact situation. Hence, identity change should 
also be stable for at least some time after students’ return. 
! 53!
 
Method: Research Design, Data, and Measurement 
 
Research design and data 
The data come from a three-wave panel survey of German students who went abroad to 
study in another European country. Most students participated in the EU program “Erasmus,” 
which facilitates student exchanges within Europe by waiving tuition fees and an easy transfer of 
credit points. I also collected data for a control group of students who did not participate in a 
study abroad program during the same period.17 Testing the effect of social interactions on 
identity formation with a sample of study abroad students seems adequate because their 
interactions should fulfill the conditions for positive contact. While studying abroad, students are 
likely to interact with a diverse set of individuals, including students from the host country as 
well as other international students. Given the shared status as students, there should be no 
particularly salient status differences in the contact situations. Also, contact situations in- and 
outside of the classroom should give study abroad students the chance to cooperate with other 
Europeans and the opportunity to form friendships across national boundaries.   
The first wave took place in July and August 2010, before individuals in the study abroad 
group left their home institution for either one or two terms. Participants were contacted again in 
May 2011 for the second wave of the survey. At this point, two thirds of the study abroad group 
had returned, while one third of the participants continued for a second term. All students were 
contacted in November 2011, which is when almost all participants were back. The third wave 
took place a relatively short time after those who stayed abroad for 12 months came back, but it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Thirty-eight institutions of higher education forwarded my survey invitation to their students. I contacted 
professors of large lecture classes at several German universities to collect data for a similarly diverse group of 
control group participants. 
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followed after about half a year for the participants who went abroad for one term between wave 
one and two. This is important to test hypothesis three. Respondents went to 24 of the 27 
member states of the EU. The largest shares of students went to France, Italy, and Spain (See 
Table 19 in the appendix for more details). 
 
!
Figure 3: Research design and timing of survey waves 
 
Measurement 
 
According to Tajfel (1981) identity has a cognitive part – i.e. self-categorization as a 
European - as well as an affective part, namely a feeling of attachment. Most research based on 
large-N surveys relies on a crude measure of identification with Europe based on a single 
variable with four categories.18 In order to use a more reliable measurement instrument, I use an 
instrument inspired by Sigalas (2010).19 My European identity measure is based on five 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The four categories offered to respondents of the Eurobarometer survey are typically: respondent identifies with 
her “nation only”/“nation and Europe”/”Europe and nation”/”Europe only”. 
 
19 Other authors, such as Roccas et al. 2008 or Bruter 2009 developed more elaborate scales to measure political 
identities. However, I opt for a revised version of Sigalas’ 2010 measure for two reasons. First, his instrument 
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questions, two tapping cognitive issues and three gauging affective matters. The first element 
measures the frequency with which someone thinks of herself as a European citizen. This builds 
on Bruter’s important point that we are interested in Europe as a political community rather than 
Europe as a geographical or cultural entity (Bruter 2005). Another cognitive measure asks 
respondents to what extent they think they have something in common with other Europeans. 
The next three items capture affective dimensions of identity: attachment to Europe as general 
measure of affection, pride in being a European, and perceived closeness to other Europeans (see 
appendix for question wordings). All scales run from zero to six. The Cronbach’s alpha is high 
among the five variables (.79), which justifies an additive index. An additive index has the 
appeal that units are more intuitively meaningful than those of a factor solution. The choice for 
an additive index or factor solution does not affect the substantive results. 
Students in the experimental and control group are broadly similar (see Table 20 in the 
appendix for descriptive statistics). All subjects are politically left leaning and closer to the 
green-liberal end of a “new politics” ideology dimension than to the traditionalist-authoritarian 
end. The mean age of respondents in the study abroad group is 23 and it is 24 in the control 
group. All participants speak at least one foreign language. Most panel participants are fairly 
mobile, travel frequently, and some lived abroad for a short time. The mean identification with 
Europe in the experimental group is slightly higher in the experimental than in the control group. 
I use logistic regression to analyze if any of these descriptive characteristics predict group 
membership, and find no statistically significant differences on most variables, including their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
proved to be reliable in a student panel. Second, his questions are much shorter than the alternatives by Roccas et al. 
2008 or Bruter 2009 and thus take less time for participants who are asked to answer the same survey multiple times, 
on their own, and online. 
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level of identification with Europe. 20 Significant differences only exist with regard to three 
variables: students in the study abroad group traveled more frequently within the past 12 months, 
they have more language skills, and they are younger.  
Panel attrition leads to a loss of participants over the course of the study. About 1500 
students took part in the first wave. Out of those, 1206 students went abroad during the course of 
the panel and are thus the experimental group. 291 students stayed in Germany and make up the 
control group. Panel attrition in the study abroad group amounts to 39 percent between the first 
and second wave, and another 29 percent between the second and the third wave. While these 
figures reflect a non-negligible loss of participants, the rate is comparable to those presented by 
other authors with similar designs (Sigalas 2010, Wilson 2011). Panel attrition does not seem to 
induce a grave bias. I run a logistics regression where dropping out (=1) and staying (=0) are the 
outcomes and the characteristics shown in Table 20 (appendix) are the independent variables. 
None of these variables are significant and the model fit is very poor (Pseudo R2 = 0.01), 
indicating that panel attrition does not seriously impair the results (for the results, see Tables 22 
and 23 in the appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 The dependent variable in this logistic regression is one for respondents in the control group and zero for those in 
the experimental group. Inserting all variables shown in Table 20 allows me to test if any of these characteristics 
predict group membership. See Table 21 in the appendix for the results. 
! 57!
Table 6: Panel respondents and attrition rates 
  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 
Study abroad 
group 
 
N 1206 738 530 
attrition in percent  38.8 29.2 
Control group N 291 149 99 
attrition in percent  49.8 33.6 
total N 1497 887 629 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
 
The malleability of identities 
 
 The results reveal that studying in another European country leads to a significant 
increase in identification with Europe. Table 7 shows that among participants who study abroad 
for one term, identification with Europe increases from 3.77 to 3.91. This change is statistically 
significant at the p<.001 level (paired t-test). The increase in identification among students who 
study abroad for two terms is larger and also statistically significant. Identification with Europe 
among these students was already above the level exhibited by those in the one term study 
abroad group, but it still increases from 3.87 to 4.12. Apparently, prolonged contact seems to 
lead to a more profound effect on students’ political identity. During the same period, 
identification with Europe among students in the control group did not change over the course of 
the panel in a statistically significant way. These results are also robust when applying a different 
modeling strategy. I re-analyze the data using a repeated measures mixed model, which is 
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commonly employed to analyze panel data in the medical sciences, psychology, and 
econometrics (Moskowitz and Hershberger 2002, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). This 
estimation technique applies the logic of multilevel modeling to the study of panel data. It allows 
pooling respondents in the study abroad and control group and shows how both groups develop 
over time (see Tables 24-27 in the appendix). The analysis reveals again a statistically significant 
change in study abroad students’ identification with Europe and no significant change in the 
control group. The results are a first confirmation of hypothesis one, according to which contact 
among citizens from different EU member states contributes to identification with Europe.  
 
 !  
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Table 7: Paired t-test on European identity change 
 Pre-test 
(SD) 
Post-test 
(SD) 
Δ 
(SE) 
Study abroad: 
1 term 
N= 556 
3.77 
(.94) 
 
 
3.91 
(.94) 
 
0.14*** 
(.03) 
Study abroad: 
2 terms 
N= 168 
3.87 
(.88) 
4.12 
(.86) 
0.25*** 
(.06) 
  
 
Wave 1 
 
 
Wave 2 
 
Control  
N=149 
 
3.62 
(.93) 
 
3.52 
(1.04) 
-0.09 
(.06) 
  
Wave 1 
 
Wave 3 
 
Control 
N= 99 
 
3.59 
(.93) 
 
3.64 
(.92) 
0.05 
(.07) 
*** p < .001, two tailed significance test, scale: 0-6, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
The effect of contact with an international community 
A comparison of means can attribute a change in students’ identities to the  
study abroad, but it does not offer direct evidence for the causal role of social interactions. I 
would like to further investigate if social interactions do indeed drive identity change. Hence, the 
key independent variables are participants’ interactions with individuals from other countries 
while abroad. I differentiate between participants’ interactions with other international students 
and interactions with students from the host country. I measure interactions with each group 
using three question items: socializing with the respective group generally, conversations 
involving personal problems, and discussing academic problems. The three items are merged 
into additive indices, namely one for contact with internationals and another one for contact with 
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hosts. Both indices exhibit high scale reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91 for the former 
index and 0.81 for the latter one.21 
I control for a number of confounding factors. I account for the fact that a respondents’ 
adjustment abroad could affect the dependent variable. For instance, an individual who finds it 
difficult to adapt abroad might not develop a stronger European identity for troubles experienced 
abroad. For similar reasons, I control for respondents’ level of homesickness as well as overall 
satisfaction with the study abroad program. Sigalas (2010) notes that a students’ multicultural 
background might also have an effect on the extent to which social interactions abroad leave an 
imprint on an individuals’ her identity. Therefore, I include variables measuring a respondents’ 
foreign language competence, frequency of traveling abroad, whether someone has previously 
lived abroad, and whether or not a students’ parents have the same nationality. I also control for 
age and gender and include a dummy for respondents who went abroad for two terms. 
A plausible argument is that cultural openness accounts for part of why social 
interactions might lead to identity change. I address this issue by using data on the reasons 
students give for their interest in a study abroad. My survey offers ten motivations as well as an 
open field and respondents could select as much as three of these simultaneously (see Table 29 in 
the appendix). Most students go abroad for a combination of reasons. For instance, students go 
abroad to improve their language skills, to get a better understanding of a different country, and 
to gain an advantage on the job market. However, there is a smaller subset of students – about 14 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Data on students’ amount of contact with internationals and hosts in the regression model comes from the survey 
they answered after their return. However, ex-post reports might be biased. Therefore I conduct a robustness check 
by analyzing if the results hold when data on contact comes from reports given by students while being abroad. The 
group of students who stays abroad for two terms (N= 124) provides me with this opportunity. They answer survey 
wave two while they are still abroad. I conduct all analyses again with this subset of students and the amount of 
social interactions they report while abroad (Table 30 in the appendix as well as Figures 11 and 12 in the appendix). 
This analysis yields similar results in all substantively important respects. 
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% – that does not pick any of three uniquely cosmopolitan reasons for their study abroad.22 
These students seem to be going abroad for job-related and other personal reasons, rather than 
because of their cultural openness. I use this difference to get a handle on whether cultural 
openness is a substantively meaningful driver for identity change. I include a dummy variable 
that equals one if respondents did not mention any cosmopolitan reason as motivation for their 
study abroad. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The three cosmopolitan motivations to study abroad are: (1) to get a better understanding of another country, (2) 
to see my own country from a different perspective, (3) to travel. See Table 29 in the appendix for all categories and 
the distribution of responses. 
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Table 8: Social interactions and European identity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Contact w/ international students 0.05*** 0.04** 0.14* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 0.06 
Contact w/ internationals*pre-EU ID    -0.03 
   (0.02) 
Contact w/ host country students 0.03 0.02 0.08 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
Contact w/ hosts*pre-EU ID   -0.01 
   (0.02) 
Satisfaction w/ study abroad  0.04 0.04 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Ease of adaption  0.02 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
Home sickness  -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) 
age  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
sex  0.04 0.04 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
2-term dummy (ref.: 1 term)  0.09 0.09 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
lived abroad  -0.07 -0.07 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
frequency of travelling   0.08** 0.08** 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Foreign language competence  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Parents nationality  0.17 0.16 
  (0.10) (0.10) 
Non-cosmopolitan  0.03 0.02 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
European identity before going abroad (Yt-1) 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.80*** 
 (.03) (0.01) (0.09) 
Constant 1.10*** 1.06** 0.46 
 (0.13) (0.42) (0.54) 
Adjusted R2 .47 0.48 0.48 
    
N 715 704 704 
significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two tailed; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Figure 4: Marginal effect of contact with international students 
 
 
!
Figure 5: Marginal effect of contact with students from host country 
 
Table 8 shows the results of three regression models that allow me to evaluate the effect 
of social interactions on identity change. The results are estimates from a static score model with 
a lagged dependent variable. The dependent variable is respondents’ European identity score 
after their return.23 I include respondents’ European identity score before going abroad as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 I pool all students who went abroad. Hence, data on students’ European identity after studying abroad comes from 
wave 2 for those who went abroad only for one term and it comes from wave 3 for those who went abroad for two 
terms.   
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independent variable. Therefore, coefficients of all other independent variables reflect their 
effect on identity change over time.24 
The results show a direct link between social interactions and identity change. Model 1 
only includes two covariates in addition to European identity at the outset, namely social 
interactions with hosts and social interactions with other international students. Social 
interactions with other international students have a statistically significant effect on identity 
change, while interactions with students from the host country do not. Model 2 shows that 
contact with internationals remains a significant predictor for identity change when applying a 
wide range of controls. Among the control variables only the frequency of traveling has a 
significant effect on identity change. Importantly, the dummy variable for the small share of 
respondents for whom cultural motivations are not one of the specific reasons for their study 
abroad is not significant. Apparently, students who go abroad only for personal or professional 
reasons rather than their cultural openness are not less likely to develop a more pronounced 
European identity. In sum, the results provide additional and direct support for hypothesis one on 
the causal effect of contact across group boundaries for a collective identity. Yet, only 
interactions with a diverse group of internationals, which mirror more faithfully the diversity 
implied by a shared European identity, have a significant effect on identification with Europe. 
This supports my second hypothesis. Theoretically, Europe is also a shared in-group when study 
abroad students have contact with locals. However, these interactions seem to be perceived 
primarily as bi-directional and do not make a shared European identity salient.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 There is a debate in various disciplines about whether using static scores with lagged dependent variable, change 
scores, or other alternatives are a most appropriate in a regression based on pretest-posttest data (Plewis 1985, 
Allison 1990, Liker, Augustyniak, and Duncan 1985, Finkel 1995). However, a static score model accounts more 
accurately for change that might be related to initial levels (Finkel 1995: 6), which is what I expect theoretically and 
find empirically. Moreover, only the static score model with initial European identity score allows me to test 
hypotheses 2, i.e. the conditional effect of contact at different levels of initial European identity. 
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In hypothesis three, I expect that social interactions have a greater effect on individuals 
with a weaker identification with Europe before going abroad, and test this through interacting 
initial European identity with both types of contact. Model 3 in Table 8 presents the results. 
Marginal effects plots visualize the substantive effect and support the notion of an interaction 
effect for social interactions with international students (Figures 4 and 5). Social interactions 
with other international students have a more pronounced effect the weaker an individuals’ 
identification with Europe before going abroad. Social interactions have no statistically 
significant effect when identification with Europe is high at the outset. These results confirm 
hypothesis two.  
 
Stability of identity change 
 
The findings indicate an important effect of social interactions in an international setting 
on the strengthening of a shared identity among Europeans. Is this a short-lived European 
identity spark due to the excitement of an adventurous journey? Or is it a durable recalibration of 
political identities? The data suggest that studying abroad leaves a lasting impression, which 
leads to a pronounced and durable European identity. A paired t-test comparing respondents’ 
level of identification with Europe at wave two and wave three shows support for this. Survey 
wave two took place shortly after respondents came back from their study abroad and wave three 
followed after another five months. As Table 9 shows, there is no drop or change in the 
European identity index between waves two and three of the panel (3.94 to 3.96, p=.63). These 
results support hypothesis three, which posits that a study abroad leaves a deep imprint on 
European identity, at least for the time covered by this survey. The stability of the identity 
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change is also remarkable given the context dependency of identities. The initial increase and 
proceeding stability in respondents’ European identity scores among study abroad students, 
highlights that my measure picks up a robust category with a particular meaning. 
 
Table 9: European identity: change and stability 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Δw1-w2 
(SE) 
Δw2-w3 
(SE) 
 
Study abroad 
group  
N= 257 
 
 
3.75 
(.94) 
  
3.94 
(.95) 
 
3.96 
(.97) 
 
.19*** 
(.05) 
 
-.0.2 
(.04) 
Control group 
N=69 
3.61 
(.98) 
3.50 
(1.07) 
3.58 
(1.01) 
-0.11 
(.09) 
.08 
(.09) 
 
*** p < .001, two tailed significance test; based on respondents who went abroad between 
wave 1 and wave 2 and who answered all waves of the panel survey. Standard errors in 
parentheses 
 
 
Conclusion !
This article seeks to contribute to the scholarly debate on the connection between social 
interactions and political identities. On a theoretical level, this study extends Deutsch’s 
transactionalist framework by showing the conditions under which social interactions can be 
expected to shape a collective identity. My findings demonstrate that social interactions across 
groups with different national backgrounds help build a common identity, especially among 
individuals with an initially weak European identity.  
Building on the contact hypothesis and its descendant, the common in-group identity 
model, I emphasize the need for contact to be a positive experience: those who interact need to 
perceive each other as hierarchically equal individuals involved in cooperative behaviors, or be 
in a position to form friendships across group boundaries. Additionally, for contact to be 
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effective it must occur among a set of individuals who are as diverse in their nationalities as 
Europe. Under these conditions, I argue that social interaction can attach a personal cognitive 
and affective meaning to a transnational collective identity, which would otherwise remain only 
an abstract category for an individual.  
 My research design has several advantages over previous empirical tests. I survey 
European exchange students before they go abroad, after their return, and again after a time lag. 
Additionally, I collect data on a control group. This pre-post test design with control group offers 
a better handle on how contact affects identity over time. The duration of the study provides new 
insights on the stability of identity change after the contact situation. 
Like other panel studies on student interactions, my study cannot control for the self-
selection of students into the study abroad program. It might be reasonable to expect that 
participants already see themselves as Europeans to begin with, which might be a reason for 
them to study abroad in the first place. If this were the case, this would bias the study against 
finding an effect of social interactions. In reality, there is considerable variation with regard to 
participants’ identification with Europe at the outset. And there are substantial differences in 
their reasons for going abroad. I do find that social interactions are less effective among 
individuals with a strong European identity to begin with. However, I can also show precisely 
that those with a weak European identity appear to be most affected by social interactions 
abroad. 
My findings strongly support the effectiveness of social interactions across group 
boundaries. Participants who studied abroad display a significant increase in their identification 
with Europe. A longer study abroad is related to a more pronounced identity change. A closer 
examination of the underlying causal process in a regression analysis allows identifying social 
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interactions as the critical factor driving identity change. The unique three-wave panel design of 
the study additionally provides a first glance into the stability of this identity change. The 
recorded change is not just a short-lived spark due to the excitement about an exchange program. 
It is stable even months after a students’ return. But perhaps the most surprising finding is that 
type of interaction matters more than quantity: for students to embrace a European identity they 
need to interact with a diverse set of people – not only with students from the host country. Only 
interactions with other international students have an effect on students’ identification with 
Europe. 
The results also raise puzzles that deserve further investigation. First, we lack a precise 
understanding of different types of European identity and their respective implications with 
regard to public support of European integration, attitudes towards authority transfers to 
Brussels, or situations in which citizens of affluent EU member states are asked to pool their 
financial resources to help neighbors in economic distress. I claim that interactions as conceived 
of by Deutsch (1953) can turn the abstract category of a collective European identity into a 
meaningful and affectively charged one for Europeans. However, contact contributes to an 
individuals’ ‘identification as a European’ based on horizontal ties among individuals from 
different European countries. Therefore, the meaning and content of this European identity is 
arguably starkly different from an identity created through other processes, such as Bruter’s 
experiment on identity building based on the salience of EU news in media coverage (Bruter 
2009). Insofar, my results underscore Cram’s point on the importance of different types of 
European identity (Cram 2012). Future research should pay a special attention on the various 
ways in which a collective identity is created in Europe and how these identities differ in their 
implications for political attitudes. 
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Second, my theoretical framework puts much emphasis on the conditions needed in order 
for contact to translate into a European identity, but many social interactions among Europeans 
do not fulfill these conditions. Tourists only travel for short periods to other European countries, 
which might only rarely allow them to have sufficiently intense interactions. Blue collar might 
stay for longer periods abroad. Yet, those who hired them might treat these workers as inferior in 
status. This hierarchical difference and how it plays out in their daily interactions could be 
critical for how migrating workers experience an integrated Europe. Future research could 
examine if social interactions among a diverse set of individuals from different national 
backgrounds still contribute to a collective identity if the contact situation is less ideal than the 
one that exchange students face.!!
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PAPER 3: IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY, AND PREFERENCES ON THE INTEGRATION 
OF EUROPE: NEW EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL STUDY 
 
 
Introduction !
National identities provide a sense of community among people from different social 
classes and sometimes from diverse religious or ethnic backgrounds. Does a similar logical apply 
in a community of different nation states? An example is the case of the European Union (EU). 
A transfer of considerable powers away from national capitals to the EU in combination with 
majority ruling in some policy fields means that national sovereignty is seriously constrained. 
Profound decisions are taken in Brussels and Europeans have considerable rights even in the 
member states to which they relocate – but are no citizens of – in order to live and work. This 
raises the question of whether a collective European identity is needed to create a political 
community that consists of individuals from diverse national backgrounds.  
Particularly influential in this context is work by Jürgen Habermas, who considers a 
collective European identity a critical ingredient for a European polity.  He argues that citizens of 
the various member states of the EU need to think of themselves as Europeans and accept 
citizens of the other member states as members of same political community in order for a 
transnational will-formation to be possible in Europe (Habermas 2001, 2006). Habermas goes 
even further and claims that when a polity extends beyond national boundaries, the civic 
solidarity that exists among fellow citizens within nations needs to grow in a corresponding 
fashion in order to include citizens of other EU member states (Habermas 2012: 29). Only under 
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this condition, decisions taken in Brussels would be accepted as legitimate, especially if they 
have redistributive consequences (Laffan 1996, Habermas 2006). 
This normative perspective raises empirical questions, most importantly, whether a 
collective European identity indeed plays the pivotal role that Habermas suggests. A broad 
literature shows that citizens who think of themselves as both citizens of their nation states and 
Europe view the EU much more positively than those who identify exclusively with their 
national community (Hooghe and Marks 2005). However, the relationship between holding a 
European identity and supporting the EU is only found in cross sectional research. Therefore, the 
relationship is only based on comparisons across individuals and could in fact be spurious. 
Evidence showing that individuals can develop a more pronounced European identity during 
their lifetime is lacking. What is more, Habermas suggests not only a close link between a 
collective European identity and views on the political integration of Europe. He also describes 
European identity and the extent to which Europeans think of each other as members of a shared 
community as two side of the same coin, i.e. for him they are inextricably linked (Habermas 
2001: 99). I take both of these arguments as my starting point and evaluate them in light of 
empirical data. 
To this end, I surveyed students before and after their study abroad in another EU 
country. I find a large share of these students to have a more pronounced European identity after 
their study abroad, and I detect a clear pattern in how identity change affects attitudes towards 
social and political integration. First, individuals who develop a stronger European identity are 
more likely to view Europeans from other EU member states as citizens with equal rights. 
Second, individuals with a more pronounced European identity are more interested in EU affairs, 
more approving of authority to be transferred to Brussels, and – to a smaller extent – they are 
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also more likely to turn out in European parliament elections. However, these implications are 
mediated by ideology. Identity change has more pronounced implications for left leaning 
respondents than right leaning respondents. Only a very strong identity change leaves an imprint 
on right leaning citizens’ views on European integration.  
 
European Identity as a Social Identity !
I understand a collective European identity as a social identity that is directed at a level 
above the nation but otherwise resembles national identity in many ways (Herrmann, Risse, 
Brewer 2004, Risse 2010, Bruter 2003, 2009, Fligstein 2008, Sanders and Bellucci 2012). Tajfel 
defines a social identity as “that part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership” (1981: 255). Hence, a European identity 
consists of two parts: a self-identification as European and an emotional attachment to the 
community of Europeans.25  
Yet, to what extent does this European identity exist and what are its observable 
implications? Individuals living in one of the member states of the EU are, at least from a legal 
point of view, citizens of nation states as well as EU citizens, but do they think of themselves as 
European or are their national identities more salient? Even if they hold a European identity, to 
what extent is this identity “chronically accessible” (Conover 1995: 143)? And what are the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Bruter (2005, 2009) proposes a differentiation between a civic European identity and a cultural one. The civic 
identity refers to political dimensions of a community, such as citizenship and elections. The cultural identity 
denotes a common cultural heritage and history. Risse (2010) finds that the underlying dimension for the civic 
notion of Europe is shared values and an appreciation of such things as the freedom to travel. For a convergence of 
the values of a modern civic Europe and the EU, Risse (2010: 51) concludes, “the EU is modern Europe” [emphasis 
in the original]. Thus, identification with Europe can be seen as an identification with the community of people that 
makes up the EU despite the imprecision of the terminology. 
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consequences of this shared European identity for issues like the support for common citizenship 
rights or the transfer of political authority to institutions of the European Union?  
Social identity theory and in particular its close relative, self-categorization theory 
(Turner et al. 1987) offers important insights to the nature and potential implications of a 
collective European identity. Self-categorization theory emphasizes that individuals can think of 
themselves as members of various groups (or categories), some of which are more exclusive, 
while others are higher-level categories that are more inclusive. An important consequence of the 
process of self-categorization is that individuals who perceive each other as members of the same 
category think of themselves as being more alike and as “interchangeable elements that share 
some representative common characteristic” (Van Lange, Kruglanski, Higgins 2012: 381). In 
comparative politics, Greenfeld and Eastwood emphasize the same point – national identity is 
“inseparably bound to the notion that all of one’s co-nationals are in some meaningful sense 
equal to oneself” (2007: 258).  
From the perspective of the common in-group identity model (Gaertner and Dovidio 
2000), a collective European identity is a higher-level identity when compared to national 
identities. The model highlights that higher-level social identities can create a sense of closeness 
among individuals who would be out-group if only more exclusive, lower level identities were 
salient to an individual. Hence, a self-categorization as European could create a sense of 
community with individuals in other countries with whom an individual shares this group 
membership. In short, whether and how much individuals identify both as Germans and EU 
citizens has important consequences for the extent to which individuals in other countries are 
seen as in-group or out-group. This directly applies the logic of a collective national identity to 
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the European level: Accordingly, a collective European identity creates bonds among Europeans 
in different EU member states.  
Both, self-categorization theory and the common in-group identity model point to a 
number of implications of a shared European identity. First, an enhanced feeling of closeness and 
the fact that individuals with the same group identity think of themselves as equal should transfer 
to an increased willingness to grant equal citizenship rights in the domestic context. Second, both 
notions might also translate into an increased willingness to accept the transfer of political 
authority to a higher organizational level. The latter is also an important function of national 
identity. National identity fuels the notion that state authority, even when exercised from a 
remote capital, is not perceived as foreign rule but as self-rule. When this link is broken, for 
instance when regional identities are more important than national identity, state authority might 
indeed be perceived as foreign rule. Strong regional identities can shape the sense that self-rule is 
only realized when authority is exercised from within the region rather than a distant capital 
(Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010, for Catalan identity in Spain, Hargreaves and Ferrando 
1997). A strong European identity might therefore create the notion that authority in Brussels is 
perceived as self-rule rather than foreign rule.  
A large body of empirical research examines whether a collective European identity 
translates into the support for a political institution, namely the European Union.26 Numerous 
studies based on cross sectional research have found a strong link between political identities and 
attitudes towards European integration. Carey (2002) shows that a strong national identity 
predicts opposition to European integration. McLaren emphasizes that citizens who see other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 My use of the term on the European level is close to Conover’s (1995: 134) ‘citizen identity’ on the national level. 
She defines a citizen identity as one of two parts of an individual’s sense of citizenship. Accordingly, a “’citizens 
identity’ is the affective significance that people give their membership in a particular political community.” 
Conover differentiates this from ‘understanding’ as a second element of an individual’s sense of citizenship, which 
refers to “the framework of beliefs that people develop about their relationship to the state and to other citizens”.  
! 75!
cultures as a threat and who are concerned about the loss of their national identity are more 
opposed to the EU membership of their country (McLaren 2004, 2007). However, many citizens 
integrate a national and European identity, as theory would predict. In fact, a majority of 
Europeans identify with their nation as well as Europe simultaneously and only a minority of 
Europeans identify exclusively with their nation (Duchesne and Frognier 1995, Risse 2010). 
Citizens with an exclusive national identity do not welcome European integration as much as 
those for whom the two identities are not mutually exclusive (Hooghe and Marks 2005).  
These empirical studies do however have a number of limitations. Their findings derive 
from a controlled comparison of attitudes towards European integration between individuals. 
Yet, such comparisons cannot establish that this relationship exists as an individual’s identity 
changes. Some researchers question the plausibility of a link between identity and support on the 
grounds that political identities in Europe are almost frozen. Roose (2013) argues that 
identification with Europe has not changed over the last decades despite identity building efforts 
of the EU. Moreover, identification with one’s continent is in other parts of the world just as high 
as in Europe. He concludes that these findings cast doubt on a causal relationship between 
identity and support for European integration.  
Recent studies analyzing change in identity and political attitudes of intra European study 
abroad students come to the conclusion that their sojourns neither affect their identities nor their 
support of European integration (Sigalas 2010, 2010a, Wilson 2011). These studies share some 
limitations. First, both authors only focus on group mean differences and conclude, based on the 
absence of a mean change, that studying abroad has been ineffective. However, Sigalas (2010: 
259) does in fact document identity change based on a regression analysis. Hence, there is at 
least some variation in the sample and some students developed a more pronounced European 
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identity. This leads to the second limitation. Both authors collect information on students’ 
identities and their views on European integration before and after a study abroad. However, they 
do not connect these data and miss the opportunity to study whether an individual’s identity 
change is related to views on other issues. I argue in contrast to these studies that the extent to 
which a European identity is a persistently salient part of an individual’s self can change in the 
short term, with important implications for a social dimension as well as a political dimension of 
European integration.  
 
Hypotheses !
Based on the common in-group identity model (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000) I derive a 
number of hypotheses regarding the effect of European identity. Developing a higher-level 
identity creates a sense of closeness to individuals who would otherwise be considered out-group 
and leads to more positive attitudes towards these individuals. If individuals hold a strong 
European identity the same logic would apply. Developing a more pronounced European identity 
should be positively correlated with more favorable views towards citizens from other EU 
member states. This feeling of closeness has important implications. Shared social identities 
foster the notion among members of the group that they are similar to one another. Subsequently, 
individuals should be more likely to grant citizens from other EU member states equal 
citizenship rights similar to the ones that they would grant members of their national community, 
such as an equal access to domestic jobs or the right to participate in local elections.27  
The effect of identity on individuals’ attitudes towards members of other groups has been 
extensively examined by the empirical literature on attitudes towards immigrants. The core !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 One should note, however, that even within nation states a fully “equal citizenship” for all individuals is often an 
ideal rather than a reality (Conover, Searing, and Crewe 2004). 
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finding is that political identities are central in explaining anti-immigrant sentiments. 28 
Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior’s (2004) experimental work shows that identities are in fact 
more powerful than economic considerations in explaining anti-immigrant sentiments. Citrin and 
Sides (2007) corroborate this with data from 20 European countries. Anxieties based on culture 
and national identity account for much variation in preferences for lower levels of immigration.29  
In fact numerous studies show that a European identity is associated with more positive 
attitudes towards immigrants. Weldon (2006) reveals that Europeans who identify only with their 
nation instead of simultaneously identifying with their nation and Europe exhibit significantly 
lower levels of tolerance towards immigrants. Dejaeghere and Quintelier (2008) survey 6000 16-
year-old Belgians. A self-categorization as European citizen is a significant predictor for 
tolerance towards immigrants.  
Gerhards and Lengfeld (2013) test a link between European identity and attitudes of 
Europeans towards citizens from other EU member states. Based on cross sectional data from 
Germany, Spain, Poland, and Turkey, they report that holding a European identity as opposed to 
identifying only with a nation significantly increases citizens’ approval of foreign EU citizens on 
their national job market. Also, having stayed abroad, a post-materialistic value orientation, an 
ideological position on the right side, and education contribute to a more approving stance with 
regard to foreign EU citizens.30 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Since this paper focuses on the role of identity for attitudes towards EU citizens from other EU member states 
moving to Germany, I do not review the rich literature on the relationship between economic competition and anti-
immigrant sentiments (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006).  
  
29 In the absence of an item measuring respondents’ attachments to their nation, the authors construct a substitute 
that must be seen critically: Using data on the policy areas a respondent thinks should be decided at the EU rather 
than the national level, Citrin and Sides (2007) assign those respondents a stronger national identity which prefer 
more policy areas to be decided at the national rather than the EU level. 
 
30 Gerhards and Lengfeld (2013a) focuses on the same topic, but does not include European identity as an 
independent variable. 
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H 1: A more pronounced European identity increases support for equal access to domestic jobs 
and local elections for EU citizens from other EU member states. 
 
Identities are however not the only factor that affects citizens’ views on other EU 
citizens. A large literature finds that a right leaning ideological orientation is associated with 
more skeptical attitudes towards immigrants. Falling short of a strong causal link, most of these 
studies point toward the role of political elites in order to explain the relationship between 
ideological orientation and anti-immigrant attitudes. Based on a comprehensive analysis of 
Eurobarometer data from 1988 to 2000, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky (2006) document 
the relation between ideology and anti-immigrant sentiment. The authors refer to the mobilizing 
effect of elite cues: “Right-wing parties that claim to protect the interests of the social groups 
under threat (i.e., socioeconomically weak native populations) have made the issue of 
immigration a central tenet of their political campaigns” (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, 
2006: 429).31 Pardos-Prado (2011) corroborates this with data from the 2002 European Social 
Survey. Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002) point out that the causality might be running in 
the opposite direction, namely, that views on immigration determine citizens’ ideological 
orientations. 
Social psychologists, by contrast, emphasize the causal role of personality characteristics 
to explain the link between ideological orientations and anti-immigrant attitudes. They point to 
right-wing authoritarianism as a personality characteristic that determines both why some 
citizens have a preference for right-wing parties as well an aversion towards diversity and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
31 The authors acknowledge, however, that parties also follow public opinion, which is why the direction of 
causality is not entirely clear. 
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immigrants. Cohrs and Stelzl (2010) as well as Weldon (2006) integrate both personality 
characteristics and ideological orientations as sources for attitudes towards immigration in their 
analysis.32 Cohrs and Stelzl’s meta study emphasizes the role of right-wing authoritarianism and 
an individual’s social dominance orientation in predicting anti-immigrant attitudes.33 Weldon 
(2006: 339) links personality characteristics and (right-wing) party cues in mobilizing against 
immigrants when he notes that “although the working class may be less tolerant, the Left in 
general has been a stauncher advocate of equality for ethnic minorities. This is especially true for 
Left-Libertarians and Green parties in Western Europe.”  
In sum, both party cueing effects and personality characteristics might explain why 
individuals with a more left leaning political orientation exhibit greater openness towards 
foreigners than their more conservative peers. Therefore, a more right leaning orientation would 
run counter to the effect of a more pronounced European identity and should diminish its effect. 
 
H 2: A right leaning orientation decreases support of an equal access to domestic jobs and local 
elections for EU citizens from other EU member states. 
 
I test the relationship between European identity and an individual’s stance on the 
political integration of Europe by examining the following three dimensions: an individual’s 
interest in EU affairs, a preference for political authority to be at the EU rather than the national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 There is a large literature on this issue in psychology. Prominent models are put forth by Altemeyer (1981), Esses 
et al. (2005) and Duckitt (2001). 
 
33 Cohr and Stelz (2010: 674) define right wing authoritarianism as consisting of three elements: “conventionalism 
(agreement with traditional societal norms), authoritarian submission (tendency to obey authority figures who 
represent these norms), and authoritarian aggression (willingness to engage in authority-sanctioned aggression 
toward individuals or groups that violate traditional norms).” The authors define an individual’s social dominance 
orientation as “a preference for hierarchical relations among social groups in society, ideally resulting in one’s own 
group having a dominant status in relation to other groups.” 
! 80!
level, and an intention to participate in European parliament elections participation. One of the 
core elements of European integration is the creation of institutions above the level of nation 
state that are, by now, equipped with considerable powers, at least in certain areas. Yet, as 
Hooghe and Marks note (2009: 2) “citizens care – passionately – about who exercises authority 
over them.” Political identities are critical for whether the actors and institutions that exercise 
authority are seen as ‘one of them’ – that is, are viewed as a part of the community citizens 
identify with – or whether they perceive authority to be exercised by remote actors and 
institutions, which might feel to them as foreign rule.  Hence, for citizens who do not think of 
themselves as Europeans, the transfer of authority from the national to the European level can 
easily be understood as merely a loss of power. In contrast, a sense of community among 
Europeans – expressed by citizens’ self-categorization as European – could imply a close 
relationship between identity and support for the political institutions of the EU.  
However, one must note that this relationship could in fact be less tight than the link 
between European identity and attitudes towards other EU citizens. A social identity indicates 
who is out-group and who is in-group, that is, it tells individuals something about the 
relationship to other individuals. Therefore, it would be more likely to find a shared European 
identity to be related most closely to the social dimension of European integration and it would 
seem more difficult for an identity change to spill over to a political dimension. Interest in the 
EU is the least costly of my three measures and should be most easily be affected by identity 
change. A preference for political authority to be at the EU rather than the national level is more 
costly. It involves that an individual approves of a loss of political power at the national level and 
it should therefore be affected by an identity change less easily. Finally, EP election participation 
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involves that an individual changes her own behavioral intentions. I expect this to be the toughest 
test for the effect of an identity change. 
H 3: A stronger European identity is associated with greater interest in EU affairs, an approval 
of authority transfers to Brussels, and the intention to vote in European parliament elections. 
 
Method !
I test my hypotheses using a panel data set, which I collected in 2010 and 2011. German 
participants of the Erasmus program of the EU answered the survey before they went abroad and 
again after their return. The first survey wave was carried out in July and August 2010, before 
students went abroad for one or two terms. Participants were surveyed again in May 2011, when 
students had returned who spent one term abroad (about two-thirds). All subjects were contacted 
again in November 2011, which is when all participants had returned. Students who stayed 
abroad were excluded from the analysis. This data set allows me to test the implication of 
identity change on preferences for the unification of Europe. However, one should note that this 
is an identity change generated by social interactions among Europeans with different national 
backgrounds. This sets it apart from a European identity as primed by EU symbols (Cram, 
Patrikios, and Mitchell 2011) or generated through the news media (Bruter 2009, Stoeckel 2011). 
Methodologically, I am interested in the extent to which this identity change carries over 
into change in students’ preferences in regard to the social integration of Europe and the political 
integration of Europe. To examine this, I calculate change scores for the variables that tap these 
preferences and analyze how identity change explains variation in these change scores. In short, I 
test if identity change has a statistically significant effect on change in students’ preferences, 
when controlling for a number of confounding factors. 
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My European identity measure is inspired by Sigalas (2010) and employs five question 
items. Two measures tap cognitive issues and three variables tap affective matters. The first item 
is about the regularity with which someone thinks of herself as a European citizen. The second 
cognitive item probes the extent to which respondents think they have something in common 
with other Europeans. The next three items measure affective dimensions: attachment to Europe, 
pride in being a European, and perceived closeness to other Europeans (see appendix for 
question wordings). The range of each scale is zero to six. Cronbach’s alpha among the five 
variables is .79, which justifies an additive index. I opt for an additive index because its units are 
more intuitively meaningful than scores of a factor solution. 
With regard to preferences on the social integration of Europe, I use two measures from 
the European Election Study 2004 (Schmitt et al. 2009). One item relates to foreign EU citizens 
on the German job market and the other item concerns their participation in German local 
elections. The first question asks about agreement with the following question: “When jobs are 
scarce, German companies should prioritize German workers over workers from other EU 
countries who want to work in Germany.” Strong agreement with this statement expresses a 
disapproval of an equal access to jobs in Germany for EU citizens form other countries. I 
recoded the answers in the analysis section so that higher values represent more positive attitudes 
towards foreigners. The second question asks respondents about whether they think citizens from 
other EU member states should be allowed to participate in German local elections. 
I have three measures to tap the political integration of Europe. The first item measures a 
respondents’ interest in EU affairs. The second item is about the intention to participate in 
European parliament elections. Because of the norm to participate in elections, I approach this 
issue indirectly and ask respondents about their opinion on the following statement: “A lot of 
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people do not participate in European Parliament elections. Other people consider it a civic duty 
to participate in these elections. Do you consider it disregarding civic duties if one does not 
participate in European Parliament elections?” The answer categories are yes/rather yes/rather 
no/no. The third concept I am interested in has to do with preferences for political authority to be 
at the European rather than the national level. I combine the following three question items here, 
which are derived from an expert survey of EU Commission officials (Hooghe 2012).34 The three 
items are (1) whether the European Commission should become the true government of the EU, 
(2) if the European Parliament should be strengthened, and (3) whether the member states of the 
EU should remain the central actors of the EU. The last item was recoded so that higher scores 
indicate a preference for the EU to be stronger vis-à-vis the member states.  
 
Results !
 Is there evidence for a relationship between identity change and the extent to which 
individuals are willing to grant citizens from other EU member states equal rights in Germany? I 
test if change over the course of the panel in European identity scores is associated with change 
in the two variables that tap preferences on the social integration of Europe – (1) disapproval of 
discrimination against EU citizens from other EU member states on the German job market and 
(2) approval of foreign EU citizens’ participation in German elections. I calculate change scores 
of all relevant variables (scores from after students’ return minus scores measured at the outset). 
Next, I regress change in the two dependent variables on identity change. I also include initial 
levels of the dependent variables as well as participants initial European identity scores as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 I am grateful to Liesbet Hooghe for providing me with an advance copy of the questions used to measure these 
dimensions in the survey of EU Commission officials (for more information about the project, see also 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/political-social-international-studies/european-commission-in-question). 
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control variables, in order to account for the fact that change (or its absence) might in part be due 
to students’ scores before going abroad. This way, I can cope both with regression to the mean as 
well as ceiling effects.35 
 The results (Table 10) clearly indicate support for the first hypothesis. Students who 
develop a stronger European identity are more likely to treat non-German EU citizens like 
German citizens. First, change in students’ European identity is associated with a statistically 
significant change in their approval of citizens from other EU member states on the German job 
market. Second, individuals who developed a stronger European identity are also significantly 
more likely to approve of foreign EU citizens’ participation in German local elections.  This 
pattern holds when controlling for ideological orientations, age, gender, and time spent abroad.  
Ideology also has a substantively and statistically significant effect. Right leaning 
respondents are less likely to exhibit change on both measures for the social integration of 
Europe. This is consistent with hypothesis 2. Apparently, studying abroad has different 
implications for attitudes of right leaning individuals. However, the (positive) identity effect and 
the (negative) ideology effect are additive effects. Therefore, right leaning respondents change 
their attitudes when they develop a much stronger European identity while being abroad. I 
calculate predicted changes based on the models in Table 10 to make this more apparent. 
 Figures 6 and 7 show percentage change on the dependent variable when there is no 
identity change (light grey) and a maximum identity change (dark grey). I use percentage change 
in order for the effect sizes to be roughly comparable. The left bars reflect values for left leaning 
respondents (5th percentile, a value of 1.9) and the right bars reflect values for right leaning 
respondents (95th percentile, a value of 7). The error bar represents a 95 percent confidence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35!The regression analysis is only based on the study abroad student sample. 
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interval. Figure 6 shows that a maximum positive identity change is associated with an increase 
in an individuals’ approval of foreign EU citizens’ on the German job market by about ten 
percent. However, the same identity change does not imply a significant increase in positive 
attitudes towards foreign EU citizens on the job market among right leaning respondents. 
Identity change also implies that left leaning respondents become much more approving of 
foreign EU citizens’ election participation. Figure 7 also shows that right leaning respondents 
show a significantly more positive stance on foreign EU citizens’ voting rights when they 
experience the maximum possible identity change. 
 What are the implications of change in European identity for attitudes on the political 
integration of Europe? The dependent variables of each model in Table 11 are change scores and 
the modeling follows the procedure in the last section. 
 Table 11 shows support for hypothesis 3. A positive European identity change increases 
support for the political integration of Europe. Identity change has a significant effect on 
respondents’ interest in the EU, the extent to which political power should be in the hands of the 
EU rather than at the national level, and respondents’ intention to participate in European 
parliament elections. This effect holds when controlling for ideology, age, gender, and time spent 
abroad.  
 The effect of ideology is not consistent across the three indicators of political integration. 
Ideological orientations do not seem to matter for change in interest in EU affairs. However, 
right leaning respondents exhibit less change on the other two dimensions of political integration 
– authority shift and European election voting – than left leaning respondents.  
 I show predicted change in Figures 8 to 10 for all three variables. The Figures show again 
a comparison between predicted change in the dependent variable in case of no identity change 
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(light grey bars) and a maximum identity change (dark grey bars). This is repeated for left 
leaning and right leaning respondents. The top figure shows that the maximum positive identity 
change is associated with a change in respondents’ interest in EU affairs of about ten percent. 
This effect does not differ by ideological orientation. Developing a stronger European identity 
correlates also with an enhanced preference for authority to be at the EU level rather than the 
national level. This change is much stronger among left leaning than among right leaning 
respondents; among the latter only a very stronger identity change has substantive implications 
for preference for where authority should be located. The effect sizes are the smallest ones for 
the relationship between identity change and intention to participate in European parliament 
elections. A maximum identity change increases left leaning respondents’ turnout intention, but 
it has no statistically significant effect on right leaning respondents. 
 
 
 
 !  
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Table 10: European identity and the social integration of Europe 
 Job market inclusion (change) 
Election participation 
(change) 
 Coef SE coef SE 
European identity 
(change) 
 
0.10** (0.04) 0.08* (0.04) 
European identity 
(pre-test) 
 
0.04 (0.03) 0.08* (0.03) 
Left-right ideology 
(pre-test) 
 
-0.07*** (0.02) -0.04* (0.02) 
2-term dummy 
 0.09 (0.06) 0.15
* (0.06) 
Age 
 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Gender  
 0.22
*** (0.06) 0.10 (0.06) 
Lagged DV 
(pre-test) 
 
-0.42*** (0.03) -0.46*** (0.03) 
Intercept 
 1.06
** (0.39) 1.27** (0.39) 
Adj. R2 .23  .25  
N 687  695  
significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two tailed test 
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Table 11: European identity and the political integration of Europe 
 
Interest in affairs 
of the EU 
(change) 
European Parliament 
election participation 
(change) 
Authority transfer 
to the EU 
(change) 
 coef SE coef SE coef SE 
European 
identity 
(change) 
 
0.21*** (0.05) 0.06 (0.03) 0.19** (0.07) 
European 
identity (pre-
test) 
 
0.20*** (0.04) 0.10*** (0.03) 0.18** (0.06) 
Left-right 
ideology 
(pre-test) 
 
0.002 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) -0.10** (0.03) 
2 term 
dummy 
 
0.14 (0.07) 0.09 (0.05) 0.02 (0.11) 
Age 
 -0.04
* (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.03) 
Gender 
 0.12 (0.07) 0.02 (0.05) 0.43
*** (0.11) 
Lagged DV 
(pretest) 
 
-0.44*** (0.03) -0.37*** (0.03) -0.41*** (0.03) 
_cons 1.96*** (0.46) 1.12*** (0.31) 2.48** (0.75) 
Adj. R2 .23  .18  .19  
N 702  704  645  
significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, two tailed 
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!
Figure 6: Approval of foreign EU citizens on German job market (predicted change in percent) 
 
 
 
!
Figure 7: Approval of foreign EU citizens' election participation (predicted change in percent)  
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!
Figure 8: Interest in EU affairs (predicted change in percent) 
!
Figure 9: Approval of authority transfer to EU level (predicted change in percent) 
!
Figure 10: Vote intention in European Parliament elections (predicted change in percent) 
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Conclusion !
Do individuals who develop a more pronounced European identity also become more 
supportive of the social and political integration of Europe? We know that individuals can 
develop a stronger European identity in the short run, but does this actually matter for what one 
might call ‘solidarity among strangers’ in Europe? I use a unique opportunity to study the effect 
of identity change in Europe: identity change based on an individual’s participation in an intra-
European study abroad program. And I find evidence that European identity change matters, but 
this effect is conditioned by ideology. 
The participants of my panel went abroad and studied in another European country. The 
sojourn abroad led to a more pronounced European identity for many, and this is related to 
viewing other Europeans in Germany more as co-citizens with equal rights—and less as 
immigrants who should perhaps not have similar rights. More specifically, they are more likely 
to approve of equal rights on the job market and equal rights to participation in local elections. 
Ideology plays an important role as well. Citizens with a more right wing ideological orientation 
were less likely to develop more positive attitudes despite an identity change. A right leaning 
individual needs to experience a very strong identity transformation before she begins viewing 
individuals from other EU member states as co-citizens.  
There is also empirical support for a relationship between an individual’s European 
identity and her views on the political integration of Europe. A more European identity leads to 
greater interest in the EU for left and right leaning individuals alike. It motivates stronger support 
for political authority at the EU level, but this effect is much stronger for people on the left than 
the right. Finally, I find limited support for a relationship between identity change and intention 
! 92!
to vote in European parliament elections. Only a strong identity change increases turnout 
intention among left leaning respondents, and there is no evidence for right leaning respondents. 
In sum, the results provide empirical support for Habermas’ normative argument that 
more European identity is needed to sustain a political and social Europe. A relationship that was 
previously established in cross sectional comparison also manifests itself when citizens’ 
identities change over time. However, both normative and empirical studies tend to underplay 
the effect of ideology. Since mainstream parties of the left and right usually support European 
integration, it is often assumed that individuals support European integration almost as much as 
the parties they vote for. A closer look reveals this assumption may need to be revisited. 
An individual’s sense of citizenship does not instantaneously translate into communal 
behavior on the national level either (Conover 1995: 149). Conover therefore emphasizes that it 
is the combination of citizen identities with other parts of the self that shape an individual’s 
relations to other citizens and the state. My results suggest that ideology is likely to be one of 
these other factors. Additionally, the results underline that citizens’ preferences for the nature of 
the EU might differ not just because of variation in their European identity. Hooghe’s (2012) 
research on EU Commission officials finds that left-libertarians prefer an EU with a strong role 
of the Commission, whereas right leaning officials prefer the member states to play a central 
role. Citizens’ attitudes might mirror these differences in the sense that some individuals might 
develop a stronger European identity without it implying a preference for a “United States of 
Europe.”!!
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PAPER 4: IDENTITY AND ELITE CUES: A RESEARCH DESIGN TO ANALYZE 
INTERNATIONAL FISCAL SOLIDARITY IN EUROPE 
 
Introduction !
Perhaps one of the most far-reaching consequences of the Euro crisis is that resources of 
affluent EU member states are used to assist other member states in economic distress. This has 
led to a shift of scholarly attention from the study of support for European integration to the 
concrete issue of fiscal solidarity among EU citizens. The goal of this project is to make three 
contributions to this new line of inquiry.36 
First, I want to uncover the role of political identities for citizens’ preferences on 
transnational redistribution in the EU. A large body of research is concerned with the role of a 
mass European identity (Bruter 2003, 2009, Fligstein 2008, Habermas 2006, Risse 2010). 
Theoretical accounts posit that a shared European identity is the base for solidarity with citizens’ 
in neighboring EU member states (Habermas 2006, Jones 2012). However, there is little 
empirical research that substantiates this claim. What is more, current research does have little 
evidence on whether political identities have a causal effect on attitudes in the context of 
European integration at all. Using an experimental research design embedded in a survey – i.e. a 
survey experiment – I want to disentangle cause and effect in the relationship between citizens’ 
identity and preferences for redistribution in Europe. To this end, I assign respondents randomly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 I presented an earlier version of this project at the Kolleg-Forschergruppe (Research College) “The 
Transformative Power of Europe” at Freie Universität Berlin on December 9th, 2013. Theresa Kuhn and I developed 
related ideas in greater detail in proposals for the SOEP-Innovation Sample of the DIW as well as for the EU 
funding program “Horizon 2020”.  
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to different conditions: one condition that primes citizens’ European identity and another 
condition that primes national identity. This allows me to test whether it makes a difference 
whether citizens form opinions when European identity rather than a national identity is salient.   
Second, I want to contribute to the new literature by analyzing the leverage of elites on 
citizens’ preferences. Against the background of the considerable costs involved in the creation 
of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), elite cues can be critical to garner public support 
for or shape opposition to redistributive policies in the EU.37 Elite cueing has been studied 
extensively in the US as well as in Europe and are an important heuristic for citizens’ when 
evaluating European integration  (Ray 2003, Steenbergen, Edwards, and De Vries 2007, Stoeckel 
2013). However, what leverage do elites have over citizens’ preferences in the realm of 
transnational redistribution in Europe? I analyze this issue in Germany, which is not only a large 
contributor to European rescue mechanisms. Since very recently, Germany also has a new anti-
Euro party, which is likely to gain seats in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Thus, 
Germans no longer only receive pro-European cues. This allows me to study both the effect of 
elite leverage and party dissent on public opinion on European integration. In order to examine 
the causal effect of elite cues, respondents are assigned to two different treatment conditions, 
namely either an elite consensus condition, or an elite dissent condition. I expect that elite dissent 
decreases support for transnational redistribution.  
Third, I want to broaden our understanding of public opinion on transnational 
redistribution by relating it to citizens’ views on domestic redistribution. In short, this involves 
testing to what extent and under which conditions citizens’ support for territorial redistribution 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Strictly speaking, the ESM does not redistribute fiscal resources in a similar way as the EU budget. However, the 
ESM is financed by EU member states and it is critical for the economic well being of struggling Euro zone 
members. Therefore I see it as a redistribution scheme of the EU.  
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within countries is a good predictor for their approval of transnational redistribution. Present 
studies on the topic lack this critical comparison. 
Finally, I want to test if and in what way ideological orientations play a role for public 
opinion on transnational redistribution. Previous research comes to surprisingly inconclusive 
results. For instance, Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) find that ideological orientations on the left/right 
dimension do not explain citizens’ attitudes on European economic governance. Bechtel, 
Hainmueller, and Margalit (forthcoming) find that citizens who support extreme parties support 
bailouts less than citizens who support mainstream parties. This would imply that preferences 
towards transnational redistribution are structured quite differently than preferences towards 
domestic redistribution where left/right ideology is the decisive dimension. Hence, citizens’ 
orientation on the libertarian/authoritarian dimension might be more important than left/right 
ideology. 
In what follows, I firstly provide a theoretical background by reviewing the literature on 
public support for European integration and how it is connected to the new debate on citizens’ 
preferences for transnational redistribution in the EU. Then, I discuss the role of identities, elite 
cues, domestic redistribution, and ideology, and how I hypothesize each concept to explain 
variation in citizens’ preferences. Finally, present the survey and the embedded experiment with 
which I plan on testing my hypotheses. 
 
Theorizing Public Opinion on Transnational Redistribution !
I use the term transnational redistribution in order to refer to a variety of policies that involve the 
use of one EU member state’s tax revenue to the economic benefit of other EU member states 
via the EU budget (e.g. structural funds), the European Stability Mechanism, or bailouts. 
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Redistribution of fiscal resources between affluent and less affluent EU member states took place 
already before the Euro crisis as part of the EU cohesion policy, which seeks to counteract 
disparities within the EU. Therefore, about a third of the EU budget – whose resources come 
mainly from the member states – are transferred to economically weak regions. However, to 
tackle the Euro crisis, an unprecedented amount of money needed to be pooled by Eurozone 
members, firstly, to fund the EFSF and, secondly, to fund the ESM. Both institutions lend money 
and do not redistribute it directly. Nonetheless, each participating country still has to contribute 
actual cash – e.g. in the case of Germany about 22 billion Euro – which raises the question under 
which conditions Europeans’ approve of this use of their taxes.   
Attitudes on redistribution at the European level could be structured in a similar way as 
attitudes towards European integration. For instance, when citizens use their view on European 
integration as a heuristic to form preferences on fiscal solidarity between EU member states. The 
literature on public support for European integration suggests three major sets of explanations 
that account for variation in citizens’ attitudes towards the EU (for an overview, see Hobolt, 
2012). First, utilitarianism plays an important role, i.e. citizens who benefit from European 
integration – such as managers and professionals – tend to be more supportive of the process 
than citizens with less skills (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998). Second, political identities 
matter in the sense that individuals who see themselves both as citizens of their country and the 
EU (inclusive nationalists) are more supportive of European integration than citizens for whom 
the two identities are in opposition to each other (exclusive nationalists) (Hooghe and Marks 
2005). Third, party cues matter in a distinct way: extreme parties on the left and right are often 
Euroskeptical, which seems to have an effect on their followers, whereas mainstream parties are 
usually supporting European integration (Ray 2003, De Vries and Edwards 2009). 
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 A new literature rejects the notion that public support for transnational redistribution in 
Europe is structured in a similar way as support for European integration. Bechtel, Hainmueller, 
and Margalit (forthcoming) use data from Germany and find that socioeconomic status and 
occupation explain little when it comes to support for transnational redistribution. Also, 
ideological orientations on the left-right dimension matter little. Instead, altruism and 
cosmopolitanism explain who supports transnational redistribution and who opposed it. Yet, 
overall the model explains only a small amount of variation. Based on another survey experiment 
conducted in Germany, Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (2012) find that the conditions of 
bailout packages determine whether a majority of respondents supports or opposes it. Public 
support is at a maximum for a bailout package whose recipient is Ireland, which involves 
spending cuts but no firing of public employees, which involves only a small German 
contribution and which comes with an endorsement by the European Central Bank. Based on 
Eurobarometer data from 2011, Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) further support the notion that 
preferences on economic cooperation in the EU are different from mere support for European 
integration. They find that citizens holding some type of European identity have high hopes for 
European economic governance – i.e. a strong role of the EU and a close cooperation of EU 
member states to tackle the crisis. In line with Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit’s 
(forthcoming) findings, socio economic status or left/right ideology matter little. 
 This literature has important shortcomings. First, the role of political identities for 
transnational redistribution is in fact unclear. Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (forthcoming) 
include a distant measure for identities – namely citizens’ interest in international affairs. Kuhn 
and Stoeckel (2014) include citizens’ identities, but their dependent variable is European 
economic governance rather than support for transnational redistribution. Both studies cannot 
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disentangle the direction of causality for they rely on cross sectional data: Citizens might not 
identity with Europe and therefore oppose fiscal transfers between EU member states. Yet, it is 
also plausible that individuals reject transnational redistribution in Europe and that is why they 
are less likely to think of themselves as Europeans.  
Second, even though elite cueing has been identified as an important process shaping 
public opinion when it comes to European integration, elite leverage has not been studied in 
relation to transnational redistribution in Europe. The existing research is heavily based on data 
from Germany at a time when no publicly visible party openly and directly opposed Germany’s 
contributions. This changed since the recent national elections in the fall of 2013 when the new 
anti-Euro party ‘Alternative for Germany’ almost won seats in the Bundestag. Hence, the 
situation before the European parliament elections (with a lower threshold to win seats) is 
different, since all mainstream parties support transnational redistribution and only one salient 
party rejects it. Against this background, I will develop theoretical expectations on how I 
hypothesize that identity, elite cues, preferences on domestic redistribution and ideology shape 
citizens’ preferences over transnational redistribution.  
 
Political identities and their mobilization 
Political identities are constructed in the long run, but more difficult to change in the short run 
(Huddy 2001, 2002). However, citizens usually hold multiple identities. Elites can mobilize 
identities so that one identity becomes more salient than another. In Europe, many citizens 
identify both as citizens of their national community and as citizens of Europe. The critical 
question is which identity is most consequential when they form preferences on transnational 
redistribution in Europe.
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Recent evidence shows that even subtle differences in the way citizens see themselves 
has consequences on how they evaluate policy proposals. Examples are the studies by Transue 
(2007) and Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004). In order to make the American (national) 
identity versus a racial subgroup identity salient, Transue (2007) asked one group of respondents 
“How close do you feel to your ethnic or racial group? and the other group “How close do you 
feel to other Americans?.” Priming a racial (subgroup) identity rather than American national 
identity decreased support for a tax increase that would benefit less affluent citizens from a 
different racial group most. Sniderman and colleagues (2004) conduct an experiment in which 
they prime the Dutch national identity in one treatment condition and citizens’ identity as 
‘individuals’ in another condition. Priming respondents’ national identity rather than their 
identity as an individual led to a substantial increase in their opposition to immigration.  
Few studies examine the extent to which a European identity can be shaped or primed. 
Notable exceptions are Bruter’s (2009) long-term panel study, as well as the survey experiment 
conducted by Cram and colleagues (2011). Bruter (2009) sent 1200 participants in six EU 
countries a bi-weekly newsletter on the EU for two years. Positive news on the EU led to an 
increase in participants’ civic European identity, while negative news led to a decrease. 
Surprisingly, the effect sizes are modest at the end of the 24-month period in which respondents 
received the newsletter, but were massive after an additional time lag of six months. 
Cram, Patrikios and Mitchell (2011) conduct an online survey experiment with Irish and 
British respondents. Respondents were exposed either to functional triggers involving the EU 
(photo of EU flag at an airport immigration zone) or symbolic primes (EU flag in front of EU 
parliament). Only functional triggers have an effect on EU support. Respondents with a high 
attachment to the EU became more pro-European when they saw the functional EU trigger. 
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Subjects with a weak European identity were less approving of the EU when seeing the same 
prime. 
I build on this work to study the effect of elite mobilization of national identity versus 
mobilization of a shared European identity. Priming one identity rather than another makes it 
salient and presumably more consequential for citizens’ preferences. When thinking about 
transnational redistribution in Europe, a salient subgroup identity would imply that citizens in 
other EU member states are more likely to be seen as an out-group. Therefore, transnational 
redistribution in Europe would be a transfer of funds to ‘others’ or an ‘out-group’. When citizens 
consider transnational redistribution while they think of themselves as EU citizens rather than 
just as Germans, they should be more likely to perceive it as redistribution within their 
community, i.e. within their ‘in-group’. In this way, transnational redistribution would be more 
similar to territorial redistribution schemes that also exist between richer and poorer territories 
within nation states.  
This does not imply European identity is a sufficient ingredient for public approval of 
transnational redistribution in Europe. Rather, mobilizing citizens’ European identity is likely to 
be a necessary condition for the approval of transnational redistribution. That is, all else equal, 
mobilizing national identity causes support for transnational redistribution to be lower than when 
citizens’ European identity is mobilized. 
H 1: Priming citizens’ European identity increases support for transnational redistribution  
when compared to a mobilization of national identity. 
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Elite dissent 
Zaller’s (1992) model on the relationship between elite messages and public opinion is 
based on three key processes: the reception, acceptance, and sampling of information. The basic 
notion is that citizens receive political information mainly from elites and this information might 
either be a one sided stream of messages or a stream with opposing views. Predispositions and 
attention to politics determine which information citizens attend to, accept, and store in their 
memory. When thinking about politics or answering survey questions, citizens sample from 
whatever information is accessible to form their opinions. Hence, it matters whether citizens 
receive one-sided information on a topic – for instance, because there is no elite dissent– or 
whether citizens receive different views on an issue, because elites are divided. Predispositions 
play a role when left leaning citizens reject cues from right leaning sources and vice versa. 
Citizens are more likely to accept and memorize cues from their party, which, in turn, determines 
the kinds of considerations that will be available to form an opinion. It follows from Zaller’s 
model (1992) that public opinion is more likely to be polarized on an issue when different parties 
send opposing messages on an issue.  
Research on public support for European integration finds powerful elite cueing effects, 
but most studies rely on cross sectional data. Ray (2003) as well as Steenbergen, Edwards, and 
De Vries (2007) show how citizens follow their trusted party on European integration. 
Supporters of mainstream parties tend to be more approving of European integration than 
supporters of extreme left- or right wing parties. Additionally, the extent to which national elites 
are united or divided on EU politics leaves traces on public opinion as well. Elite conflict over 
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European integration has been found to decrease support for European integration and to 
increase ambivalence among the public (Steenbergen and De Vries 2012, Stoeckel 2013). To 
date, only Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit (forthcoming) show an association between elite 
positions and public opinion on transnational redistribution in Germany. They find that 
supporters of mainstream parties – i.e. the parties that approved past bailout packages – view 
transnational redistribution more favorably than supporters of an extreme left or right wing party.  
Recent survey experiments demonstrate how elite cues affect citizens’ preferences also in 
most direct ways. For instance, Bullock (2011) finds that policy information affects citizens’ 
opinions, but only in the absence of party labels. When a party cue was given, Democrats and 
Republicans were driven towards the position of their party. In contrast, Nicholson (2012) finds 
that support for a policy was not higher among Democrats when they saw Obama would support 
it. However, when Democrats learn that then presidential candidate McCain supports the same 
policy, they support it much less than when not seeing the Republican cue.  
Recent experimental work in the context of Europe’s multiparty systems shows similar 
cueing effects. For instance, Aaroe (2012) conducts laboratory experiments in Denmark’s 
multiparty system. Using different source cues – e.g. an extreme right wing party leader or the 
prime minister – and various policy issues Aaroe finds ‘contrast effects.’ That is, respondents 
who dislike the party or the party leader are less likely to take his position when the source cue is 
present. Brader, Tucker, and Duell (2013) use a survey experiment to examine whether parties 
can pull their supports in Great Britain, Hungary, and Poland on various issues. They find 
citizens to generally follow their party’s position. The party cue effect is stronger the older a 
party is, when the party is an opposition party, and when the party has a more ideologically 
coherent image. Hobolt’s (2009) experiment involves a random assignment of respondents to a 
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condition in which they are asked about whether they would like Britain to join the Euro, either 
while seeing that the British (Labour) government supports it (treatment condition) or while not 
seeing any elite cue (control condition). Respondents in the treatment condition were 
significantly more likely to approve joining the Euro than respondents in the control condition, 
who did not receive this cue. Additionally, the elite cue decreases the share of undecided 
respondents. 
Based on this discussion, I expect elite cues to shape public opinion. In particular, I 
assume that a salient elite consensus increases public support for transnational redistribution 
relative to a situation with no cues (control condition). When elite dissent is salient, I expect 
voters’ prior attachments to condition the extent to which party cues are effective. Strong party-
identifiers follow the position of their party regardless of whether there is a salient elite dissent or 
not. This view is supported by research on biased information processing (Taber 2003). 
Accordingly, citizens do not attend all information equally, put an emphasis on information from 
a trusted source, and disregard all other information. Hence, in a situation with elite dissent, I 
expect citizens with a strong attachment to any one of the parties in the German Bundestag to 
exhibit high support for transnational redistribution when compared to a situation with no cues 
(control condition). I do not expect elite cues to be effective for citizens without strong party 
attachments when elite dissent is salient – that is, I do not expect their support for transnational 
redistribution to be different from the control condition. In contrast, supporters of the 
“Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD), which opposes transnational redistribution, should exhibit 
particularly low support for transnational redistribution in the presence of a cue from their party. 
 
H 2a: Salient elite consensus increases support for transnational redistribution. 
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H 2b: In a situation with salient elite dissent, only strong party identifiers follow the cues of their 
party. Hence, (strong) supporters of parties with seats in the German Bundestag exhibit high 
support for transnational redistribution when receiving a party cue. Supporters of the AfD 
exhibit particularly low support for transnational redistribution. 
 
 
Left/Right and Gal/Tan Ideology 
When it comes to citizens’ ideological orientations, one must note that both the 
(economic) left/right dimension and the “new politics” dimension or gal/tan dimension could 
structure attitudes on transnational redistribution. If public opinion towards transnational 
redistribution is more similar to preferences on domestic redistribution, one can expect left/right 
orientations to have some bearing. However, if an individuals’ support for European integration 
is more relevant, attitudes on transnational redistribution are likely to be structured by the gal/tan 
dimension.  
Public opinion on redistribution between social classes is in fact a particularly well 
researched topic. A broad literature discusses two main mechanisms that complement each: self-
interest and ideological beliefs. Individuals in lower social classes, with less income, or less 
education consistently support higher levels of redistribution than their peers with more income 
or education (Svallfors 1997, Corneo and Grüner 2002, Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003, 
Finseraas 2008).38 In short, citizens who are likely to be recipients of redistribution are more 
likely to support it than citizens who are likely contributors. It is difficult to evaluate what this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Analyses using data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) rely on respondents’ approval of the 
following statement „It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people 
with high incomes and those with low incomes” (ISSP Research Group 2008). 
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implies for transnational redistribution in Europe and in the context of a ‘net-contributor’ country 
in the EU. Following the self-interest logic, all citizens in a net-contributor country would 
oppose transnational transfers, because it might run against their interests in a narrow sense. 
Hence, there should be little variation between preferences of rich and poor individuals. 
A second strand of literature posits that ideological considerations have an effect on 
citizens’ preferences for redistribution over and above self-interest. However, the direction of 
causality here is not entirely clear. Citizens might be left leaning because of their stance on 
redistribution (Finseraas 2008). In any case, there is ample evidence for a relationship between 
beliefs about the reasons for inequality, egalitarian values, reciprocity considerations on one side 
and attitudes towards redistribution on the other side (Corneo and Grüner 2002, Bénabou and 
Tirole 2005, Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003, Kangas 1997, Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Fong 
2001). In sum, left leaning citizens are more supportive of redistribution even when controlling 
for education, occupation, and income. Thus, if values and beliefs imply that left leaning citizens 
find redistribution between rich and poor more important than right leaning respondents 
irrespective of self-interests, left/right orientations should also predict support for transnational 
redistribution in Europe. Moreover, a new party that opposes transnational redistribution in 
Europe should be more successful among right leaning respondents. Therefore, elite cues against 
transnational redistribution in Europe should have a stronger effect on right leaning citizens than 
on left leaning citizens. 
However, ideological orientations on the left-right dimension say little about citizens’ 
views on European integration. In fact, supporters of social democratic parties and supporters of 
conservative parties often have broadly similar attitudes towards the EU. Yet, it is supporters of 
extreme parties on the left and right who disapprove of European integration. In short, public for 
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European integration maps onto a second ideological divide: that is, a dimension with individuals 
holding an authoritarian view on one end and citizens with a libertarian orientation on the other 
end (Hooghe and Marks 2009, Kriesi et al. 2012). Citizens with an authoritarian orientation care 
passionately about issues such as immigration or a homogenous culture. For these individuals,  
European integration poses a threat and is therefore opposed by them, whereas it is much more 
easily reconcilable with a libertarian orientation. These differences might be important also for 
attitudes on transnational redistribution. Citizens could see redistribution on the European scale 
as yet another step of European integration, which would spark most strongly the opposition of 
individuals with an authoritarian ideological orientation. 
 
H 3: Citizens holding a left leaning ideological orientation are more supportive of transnational 
redistribution than right leaning citizens; an anti-Euro party cue decreases support for 
transnational redistribution more among right leaning respondents than among left leaning 
respondents.  
 
H 4: Citizens holding a libertarian orientation rather than an authoritarian are more supportive 
of transnational redistribution. 
 
Attitudes towards domestic redistribution 
Transnational redistribution differs from redistribution between rich and poor citizens, for it is 
about territory rather than class. It refers to transfers between rich and poor regions or countries. 
Therefore, citizens’ attitudes towards inter-regional redistribution within a country might be a 
particularly good predictor for their views on transnational redistribution. European countries 
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differ in the legal provisions for and extent to which they redistribute between rich and poor 
regions. For instance, Germany has both a fiscal equalization mechanism between its states, as 
well as a so-called solidarity tax on incomes that channels funds to regions that once were in 
Eastern Germany. I argue that citizens who approve of territorial domestic redistribution are also 
more likely to approve of transnational redistribution. First, these citizens have an awareness for 
territorial inequality. They seem to regard markedly different living conditions within different 
parts of a single community as something that needs to be counteracted. Second, these citizens 
approve of a transfer of tax resources between richer regions to poorer regions as an appropriate 
means to confront territorial inequalities. Thus, holding wealth of a region constant, citizens who 
support domestic redistribution should be more supportive of transnational redistribution. I 
expect this relationship to be stronger among individuals who think of themselves as Europeans 
rather than exclusively as Germans, because they are more likely to think of Europe as a 
community within which inequalities need to be addresses in a similar fashion as in domestic 
communities.   
 
H 5: Citizens who support interregional redistribution domestically are more supportive of 
transnational redistribution. This relationship is stronger among citizens who hold a more 
pronounced European identity. 
 
Methodology !
The centerpiece of this project is an original online survey of a probability sample of 
about 1000 German citizens. I focus on Germany because it is the largest contributor to the 
different redistributive schemes of the EU (e.g. Structural Funds and the ESM). Besides, all 
parties that have seats in the German parliament support the Euro and a willing to support future 
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fiscal transfers in Europe, albeit under different conditions. Additionally, there is a new party – 
‘Alternative for Germany’ – that runs a campaign against the Euro and that opposes transnational 
redistribution in Europe. This party is likely to win seats in the European Parliament elections in 
May 2014 and hence Germany allows me to study the effects of elite cueing in the context of a 
campaign that is actually unfolding. 
Although online surveys are less representative of the population than telephone surveys, 
a growing number of studies in political science relies on this cost efficient data source (Cram, 
Patrikios, and Mitchell 2011, Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2013, Bechtel, Hainmueller, and 
Margalit forthcoming). Bechtel and colleagues show that socio economic biases are limited in 
nature and can be dealt with by employing survey weights (Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 
forthcoming). Following the literature on elite and identity cueing effects, I want to employ a 
survey experiment to test hypotheses two and three (on survey experiments, see Barabas and 
Jerit 2010). Survey experiments combine the advantages of an experiment, such as the random 
assignment of treatment and control conditions, with the benefits of a large-N sample of the 
population. I plan on randomly assigning respondents to one of two identity priming conditions 
and to one of two elite cueing condition. Hence, there are four different treatment conditions as 
well as a pure control condition. 
 
(1) Identity Priming: 
In the identity priming condition respondents are randomly assigned to one of two 
treatment conditions: a European identity condition or a national identity condition. The identity 
priming consist of both a ‘question-as-treatment’ design as well as visual cues. Respondents are 
asked three questions about their European identity. In the background of the screen are EU 
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symbols such as the EU flag and a ballot box with the ‘EU stars’ on it. In the national identity 
condition respondents see questions about the extent to which they identify as Germans. 
Additionally, respondents see soccer fans dressed in black-red-yellow, German flags, and the 
German Bundestag. 
 
(2) Elite Cueing: 
There are two different treatment conditions with which I test the effect of elite cues 
(hypothesis 2). The first treatment makes elite consent salient. After asking the respondent which 
party she supported in the last national elections, the next site displays a statement which says 
that this party along with all other parties in the Bundestag support the Euro as well as future 
transnational redistribution.39 The second treatment makes elite dissent salient. The respondent 
first reads the same statement about her “trusted party’s” support for the Euro and transnational 
redistribution. What follows is another statement about a new party. It reminds the respondent 
that there is a party campaigning for seats in the European parliament elections, which is against 
the Euro and which opposes future fiscal transfers between Germany and other countries in the 
EU.  
Table 12 presents the five conditions of the survey experiment. Subjects are randomly 
assigned to one of these conditions before answering the same items on transnational 
redistribution in the EU. Condition one includes the priming of national identity and further 
contains an elite consensus frame, i.e. subjects get questions on the extent to which they identify 
with their country and see information on the fact that all parties in the German parliament 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 All parties currently in the Bundestag support the Euro and future transnational redistribution, so this site only be 
inapplicable for those respondents who did not vote or who voted for a party that did not make it into the Bundestag. 
These respondents only see the statement ‘All parties currently in the German Bundestag support the Euro and 
future transnational redistribution in Europe’. 
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support EU wide redistribution. In condition two respondents’ European identity is primed by 
using respective question items, before they see information about the party consensus on EU 
wide redistribution in the German parliament. Condition three primes respondents’ national 
identity before exposing them to information about party dissent: respondents learn that all 
parties in the German parliament support transnational redistribution in Europe, while a new 
party – the “AfD” – opposes it. Condition four primes respondents’ European identity before 
exposing them to the party dissent between the parties in parliament and the new party “AfD”. 
Condition five is a control condition without any identity priming or elite cueing. 
 
Table 12: Overview of the five conditions of the survey experiment 
  Parties agree Parties disagree No party cue  
National Identity Condition 1: 
National identity 
+  
Elite consensus 
Condition 3: 
National identity + 
Elite dissent 
 
  
European Identity Condition 2: 
European 
identity +  
Elite consensus 
Condition 4: 
European identity + 
Elite dissent 
 
No identity priming     Condition 5: 
Pure Control  
 
 
 
Measurement 
Dependent variable 
I use three different questions in order to tap support for transnational redistribution in 
Europe.40 The first item relates to redistribution in a crisis situation (taken from Special 
Eurobarometer 74.1). It reads as follows: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: In times of crisis, it is desirable for Germany to give financial help to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 I am very grateful to Theresa Kuhn and the discussions we had about these measures in Berlin in 2013. She 
pointed out that a question measuring a respondent’s willingness to make a personal sacrifice to help an EU member 
state in economic difficulties was already used in a Eurobarometer from 1981. We developed a proposal for the 
German ‘SOEP-Innovation Sample’ using the measures for transnational redistribution that are presented here. 
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another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties.” The second 
question is about citizens’ attitudes towards transnational redistribution on the European level 
also outside of crisis situations. EU wide redistribution is portrayed as something that is akin to 
redistribution between rich and poor regions within a country. The question is  “Germany’s 
contributions to the EU budget are also used to provide financial assistance to economically 
weak countries. Do you agree with this policy?” Both of the aforementioned questions refer to 
redistribution in an abstract way, because they do not make personal costs salient. The third item 
directly asks respondents about their willingness to contribute to transnational redistribution 
personally. It is adapted from a question that was used in Eurobarometer 15 in 1981: “Are you, 
personally, prepared or not to make some personal sacrifice, for example, paying a little more 
taxes to help another country in the European Union experiencing economic difficulties?” 
(Source: adapted from Eurobarometer 15, Spring 1981). 
 
Independent variables 
 In order to measure identities, I use questions for European and national identity based on 
items suggested by Bruter (2003). Additionally, I ask the standard Eurobarometer question that 
allows measuring if a respondent holds an exclusive and inclusive national identity (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005). The European identity measurement includes the following three items from 
Bruter (2003): 
(1) “On a scale of one to seven, one meaning that you do not identify with Europe at all, and 
seven meaning that you identify very strongly with Europe, would you say that you...?” 
(2) “Would you say that you feel closer to fellow Europeans than, say, to Chinese, 
Australian, or American people?” 
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(3) “In the near future, do you see yourself ... ? As a) only German, b) German and 
European, c) European and German, d) European only” 
The national identity measurement tries to be as similar as possible to the aforementioned 
questions, using the following wordings that are adapted from Bruter (2003): 
(1) “On a scale of one to seven, one meaning that you do not identify with Germany at all, 
and seven meaning that you identify very strongly with Germany, would you say that 
you...?” 
(2) “Would you say that you feel closer to fellow Germans than, say, to British, Spanish, or 
Italian people?” 
In order to measure support for territorial redistribution within German, I use an item from 
the German Politbarometer survey 2011 West (Jung, Schroth, and Wolf 2013). It reads: 
“Because of the German fiscal equalization mechanism, economically poorer regions receive 
financial resources from richer region. Do you agree with this policy?” 
Left/right ideology is measured with a standard question text commonly used (e.g. 
Eurobarometer 63.4) and I employ a scale running from 0 to 10: “In politics, people sometimes 
talk about left and right. On a left-right scale where [0] means left and [10] means right, where 
would you place yourself?”. Measuring gal/tan ideology is more complicated, for it refers to a 
dimension about party competition that is not easily salient to citizens. Therefore, I want to 
measure citizens location on a libertarian-authoritarian scale inspired by Evans, Heath, and 
Lalljee (1996) and adjusted to the German context: “To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements: a)Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional 
German values. And b) Homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children.” 
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APPENDIX 1: Supplementary Statistics for Paper 1 
 !
Table 13: Question wording (Eurobarometer 63.4) 
Variable Construction and Source 
Dependent variable:  
Attitude towards the EU Based on answers to the following question:  
What does the European Union mean to you personally?  
[Answer options read out to respondent; rotation from top to 
bottom/bottom to top, 7 positive items: peace, economic 
prosperity, democracy, social protection, freedom to travel, 
cultural diversity, stronger say in the world, 6 negative items: 
unemployment, bureaucracy, waste of money, loss of cultural 
identity, more crime, not enough control at external frontiers] 
(Source: EB 63.4 QA 12) 
 
Indifferent = EU has no meaning to respondent at all 
positive = EU has only positive meanings to respondent 
negative = EU has only positive meanings to respondent 
Ambivalent= EU has positive and negative meanings to 
respondent 
 
Country level variables:  
Elite division For each country, I calculate the standard deviation of the 
overall orientations of parties towards European integration. 
Then, I rescaled this variable to have a range from zero to 
one. 
 
(Source: Chapel Hill party expert survey 2006) 
Net fiscal transfer Net EU fiscal transfer: average of 2004 and 2005 and as 
percentage of Gross National Income (GNI), (Source: EU 
budget 2010 – Financial Report, Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2011) 
EU membership length EU membership length in decades 
Individual level variables:  
EU knowledge  For each of the following statements about the European 
Union could you please tell me whether you think it is true or 
false? (Source: EB 63.4 QA24) 
_1: The European Union currently consists of fifteen member 
states 
_2: The members of the European Parliament are directly 
elected by the citizens of the European Union 
_3: The European Union has its own anthem 
_4: The last European elections took place in June 2002 
0= if no question was answered correctly, 5= if all questions 
were answered correctly 
 
 
 
 
 
Education How old were you when you stopped full-time education? 
(Source: EB 63.4 D8) 
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Recoded: 1= 14 years, 9 = 22 years and older, 10= still 
studying 
News media consumption Additive index based on the following three items: 
About how often do you...? [every day, several times a week, 
once or twice a week, less often, never, DK] (Source: EB 63.4 
QA 17) 
_1: Watch television news programs 
_2: Read the news in daily newspapers 
_3: Listen to radio news programs 
Attachment to Europe People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town 
or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please 
tell me how attached you feel to Europe. (Source: EB 63.4 QA 
35) 
Very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all 
attached, DK (excluded) 
Trust in EU institutions Additive index based on the following three items: 
And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or 
tend not to trust it? [tend to trust=2, tend not to trust=0, DK=1] 
(Source: EB 63.4 QA23) 
_1: The European Parliament 
_2: The European Commission 
_3: The Council of the European Union 
_4: The Court of Justice of the Europeam Communities 
Frequency discuss politics When you get together with friends, would you say you 
convince friends often, from time to time, rarely or never? 
(Source: EB 63.4 QA1) 
Possessions Which of the following goods do you have? (TV; DVD player; 
CD player; Computer; Internet access; a car; an 
apartment/house which you have finished paying for; an 
apartment/house which you are paying for; DK) (Source: EB 
63.4 D46) 
National econ. prospects What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will 
the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it 
comes to the economic situation in (COUNTRY) ? [better=2, 
worse=0, the same=1] (Source: EB 63.4 QA4_2) 
Personal prospects What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will 
the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it 
comes to the financial situation of your household? [better=2, 
worse=0, the same=1](Source: EB 63.4 QA4_1) 
Age Age in years (Source: EB 63.4 D41) 
Gender Male = 0, Female = 1 (Source: EB 63.4 D10) 
Occupation Did you do any paid work in the past? What was your last 
occupation? (Self employed, managers, other white collar, 
house person, manual worker, unemployed, retired, students) 
(Source: EB 63.4 D15) 
Political Orientation In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How 
would you place your views on this scale? 1=left, 10=right 
(Source EB 63.4 D1) 
 
 
  
! 115!
Table 14: Summary statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean SD N 
 
Dependent variable: 
     
Attitude towards the EU categorical variable, see Table 2 for distribution 
 
Country level variables: 
     
Elite division 0.5 2.42 1.55 0.50 22 
Net fiscal transfer -0.46 2.2 0.51 0.85 25 
EU membership length 0 5 2.02 1.96 25 
 
Individual level variables: 
     
EU knowledge  0 4 1.79 1.18 24801 
Education 1 10 5.46 3.02 24801 
News media consumption 1 5 2.11 0.94 24708 
Attachment to Europe 1 4 2.81 0.89 24297 
Trust in EU institutions 0 8 5.03 2.89 24801 
Frequency discuss politics 1 4 2.64 0.98 24665 
Possessions 0 6 3.80 1.86 24801 
National econ. prospects 0 2 0.85 0.74 23373 
Personal prospects 0 2 1.06 0.65 24192 
Age 15 97 47.27 18.22 24791 
Gender 0 1 0.56 0.50 24801 
Occupation: self employed 0 1 0.75 0.26 24801 
Occupation: managers 0 1 0.11 0.31 24801 
Occupation: other white coll. 0 1 0.11 0.31 24801 
Occupation: manual worker 0 1 0.19 0.39 24801 
Occupation: house person 0 1 0.09 0.29 24801 
Occupation: unemployed 0 1 0.06 0.24 24801 
Occupation: retired 0 1 0.27 0.44 24801 
Occupation: students 0 1 0.09 0.29 24801 
Pol. Orientation (very left) 0 1 0.07 0.25 24801 
Pol. Orientation (left) 0 1 0.18 0.38 24801 
Pol. Orientation (middle) 0 1 0.35 0.48 24801 
Pol. Orientation (right) 0 1 0.16 0.37 24801 
Pol. Orientation (very right) 0 1 0.06 0.24 24801 
Pol. Orientation (No Answer) 0 1 0.18 0.38 24801 
Note: This table shows the range and summary statistics of the variables before they were 
hierarchically centered and standardized. 
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Table 15: Meanings of the EU for respondents 
  
Number of negative meanings of EU to respondents 
  
N
um
be
r o
f p
os
iti
ve
 m
ea
ni
ng
s 
of
 E
U
 to
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 total 
0 5.7 5.1 4.5 3.0 1.3 0.6 0.4 5066 
 (1410) (1253) (1108) (748) (314) (146) (87) 20.4 
1 
 
10.4 5.9 4.0 1.9 0.8 0.3 0.1 23.5 
 (2588) (1460) (980) (469) (204) (82) (32) (5815) 
2 
 
10.8 6.0 2.9 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 22.0 
 (2682) (1491) (709) (330) (157) (70) (26) (5465) 
3 
 
9.0 3.5 1.7 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 16.0 
 (2230) (879) (433) (221) (103) (66) (24) (3956) 
4 
 
4.3 2.0 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 8.6 
 (1055) (504) (291) (136) (74) (47) (13) (2120) 
5 
 
2.3 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 5.2 
 (574) (271) (186) (129) (70) (41) (13) (1284) 
6 
 
1.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 2.4 
 (246) (138) (106) (48) (37) (21) (6) (602) 
7 
 
0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.0 
 (202) (102) (67 (55) (37) (13) (17) (493) 
total 44.3 24.6 15.6 8.6 4.0 2.0 0.9 100 
  (10987) (6098) (3880) (2136) (996) (486) (218) 24801 !
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Table 16: Distribution of respondents for meaning items 
Meaning item Mentioned by 
(total N= 24801) 
in percent 
 
Positive meanings: 
  
Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the 
European Union 13,275 53.53 
Peace 8789 35.44 
Stronger say in the world 6779 27.33 
Cultural diversity 6540 26.37 
Economic Prosperity 5983 24.12 
Democracy 5731 23.11 
Social protection 3479 14.03 
 
Negative meanings 
  
Bureaucracy 5772 23.27 
Waste of money 4975 20.06 
More crime 4899 19.75 
Unemployment 4590 18.51 
Not enough control at external frontiers 4537 18.29 
Loss of our cultural identity 3215 12.96 
Note: Respondents were free to choose as many meanings as they wanted. Presentation: 
most often mentioned meaning to least often mentioned one. Order was rotated for 
respondents during the telephone surveys. 
 
 
 
Table 17: Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
Variable VIF 
EU knowledge  1.10 
Education 1.73 
News media consumption 1.14 
Attachment to Europe 1.11 
Trust in EU institutions 1.16 
Frequency discuss politics 1.08 
Possessions 1.50 
National econ. prospects 1.24 
Personal prospects 1.09 
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Table 19: Countries visited by participants of the panel study 
 
1 term abroad 
 
2 terms abroad 
 
Country N Percent N Percent 
Austria 4 0.71 4 2.33 
Belgium 9 1.59 1 0.58 
Bulgaria 2 0.35   
Czech Republic 7 1.24 4 2.33 
Denmark 23 4.06 4 2.33 
Finland 26 4.59 4 2.33 
France 117 20.67 33 19.19 
Greece 5 0.88 1 0.58 
Hungary 8 1.41 2 1.16 
Ireland 25 4.42 3 1.74 
Italy 34 6.01 20 11.63 
Latvia 4 0.71   
Lithuania 1 0.18   
Luxemburg 1 0.18   
Malta 1 0.18   
Netherlands 18 3.18 5 2.91 
Poland 11 1.94 3 1.74 
Portugal 9 1.59 4 2.33 
Rumania 1 0.18 1 0.58 
Slovakia 2 0.35   
Slovenia 1 0.18 1 0.58 
Spain 113 19.96 40 23.26 
Sweden 77 13.6 14 8.14 
UK 67 11.84 28 16.28 
 
total 566 100 172 100 
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Table 20: Study abroad and control group  descriptive statistics 
 Study abroad group Control group 
Age 23.1 24.0 
 
Gender 
Female: 
Male: 
 
 
66.5 % 
33.5 % 
 
 
61.7 % 
38.3 % 
 
Multicultural background 
 
Parents nationality:  
Same:  
Different: 
 
93 % 
7.0 % 
 
98.0 %  
2.0 % 
 
Foreign languages 
Spoken 
0  
1  
2  
2 <  
 
 
 
 
0 % 
22.1 % 
50.3 % 
27.6 % 
 
 
 
 
0.7 % 
44.3 % 
39.6 % 
15.4 % 
 
Frequency of travelling abroad  
in past 12 months 
Not at all 
 
 
0.6 % 
 
 
2.7 % 
1-2 times 5.0 % 18.8 % 
3-4 times 18.0 % 30.2 % 
5-6 times 25.7 % 21.5 % 
7 times or more 50.8 % 26.9 % 
   
Lived abroad 
No: 
Yes: 
 
 
54.3 % 
45.7 % 
 
59.1 % 
40.9 % 
Political background  
GAL-TAN ideology 3.2 2.9 
Left-right ideology  4.1 3.8 
European identity index (low to high) 3.78 3.62 
N 724 148 
Note: Data is based only on respondents that are included in the subsequent analyses. 
!
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Table 21: Analysis of differences between study abroad and control group (logistic regression) 
 Coefficient  Standard Error 
Age 0.12 ** 0.04 
Gender 0.01  0.22 
 
Multicultural background 
  
Parents nationality 
(1=different) -1.14  0.62 
Foreign languages 
Spoken  -0.36 ** 0.14 
Frequency travelling abroad -0.59 *** 0.10 
Lived abroad 0.08  0.11 
 
Political background 
  
GAL-TAN ideology -0.06  0.06 
Left-right ideology  -0.13  0.08 
European identity index 0.06  0.11 
 
constant -1.59  1.10 
N 825   
Pseudo-R2 0.11   
Note: 1= control group, 0=study abroad group; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 22: Analysis of drop-outs in study abroad group (logistic regression) 
 Coefficient  Standard 
Error 
Age 0.08  0.03 
Gender 0.06  0.14 
 
Multicultural background 
  ! !
Parents nationality 
(1=different) 0.35  0.23 
Foreign languages 
Spoken  -0.07  0.08 
Frequency travelling abroad 0.03  0.07 
Lived abroad 0.08  0.07 
 
Political background 
  ! !
GAL-TAN ideology -0.01  0.04 
Left-right ideology  0.04  0.05 
European identity index -0.04  0.07 
 
constant -2.62 ** 0.90 
N 1126  
Pseudo-R2 0.01  
Note: 1= dropped out, 0=stayed in panel; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 23: Analysis of drop-outs in control group (logistic regression) 
 Coefficient  Standard Error 
Age 0.06  0.04 
Gender 0.08  0.28 
 
Multicultural background 
  
Parents nationality 
(1=different) 0.65 
 
0.81 
Foreign languages 
Spoken  -0.40 
 
** 0.19 
Frequency 
travelling abroad -0.02 
 
0.13 
Lived abroad 
(1=yes) 0.17 
 
0.15 
 
Political background 
  
GAL-TAN ideology 0.09  0.08 
Left-right ideology  0.33 ** 0.11 
European identity index -0.14  0.11 
 
constant -2.45 
 
 1.17 
N 269   
Pseudo-R2 0.09   
Note: 1= dropped out, 0=stayed in panel; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 !
Table 24: Repeated measures mixed model (1 term abroad group) 
 Coefficient  Standard Error 
Group effect 0.15  0.09 
Time effect -0.10  0.06 
   
Time by Group 
0.23 
 
** 0.07 
    
constant 3.62 *** 0.08 
    
Random effects parameters   
Var (constant) 0.62 *** 0.04 
Var (residual) 0.28 *** 0.01 
    
N (observations) 1410   
N (groups) 705   
Log-likelihood -1706.1527   
Multilevel model with time points nested within individuals; DV= European identity index; ‘time  
effect’ refers to European identity change between wave 1 and wave 2, ‘group effect’ compares  
study abroad and control group, ‘time by group’ tests the statistical difference of the change in  
the two groups over time 
 
 !!
Table 25: Post hoc estimation following repeated measures mixed model (1 term abroad group) 
test for significance of change between wave 1 and 2 by group based on mixed model shown 
above (“delta method”; 1 term abroad students) !
 Coefficient  Standard Error 
Control group 
 
Wave 
2 vs. 1 -0.10 
 
0.06 
 
Study abroad group 
 
Wave 
2 vs. 1 
0.14 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 0.03 !!
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Table 26: Repeated measures mixed model (2 term abroad students) 
 Coefficient  Standard Error 
Group effect 0.29 * 0.11 
Time effect 0.05  0.07 
   
Time by Group 
0.19 
 
* 0.09 
    
constant 3.59 *** 0.09 
    
Random effects parameters   
Var (constant) 0.52 *** 0.06 
Var (residual) 0.28 *** 0.02 
    
N (observations) 534   
N (groups) 267   
Log-likelihood -627.80519   
Multilevel model with time points nested within individuals; DV= European identity index; ‘time  
effect’ refers to European identity change between wave 1 and wave 3, ‘group effect’ compares  
study abroad and control group, ‘time by group’ tests the statistical difference of the change in  
the two groups over time 
 
 
 !
Table 27: Post hoc estimation following repeated measure mixed model (2 term abroad group) 
test for significance of change between wave 1 and 3 by group based on mixed model shown 
above (“delta method”; 2 term abroad students) !
 Coefficient  Standard Error 
Control group 
 
Wave 
3 vs. 1 0.05 
 
0.07 
 
Study abroad group 
 
Wave 
3 vs. 1 
0.25 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 0.06 !!
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Table 28: Question wording I (panel data set) 
Item Question wording Scale 
 
Dependent variable 
  
EU citizenship How frequently do think of yourself as an EU 
citizen? 
0 (not at all) to 
6 (very often) 
EU attachment People may feel different levels of attachment 
towards different geographical areas. How 
attached do you feel to Europe?  
0-6 
Closeness How close do you feel to other Europeans? 0-6 
Pride Are you proud of being European? 0-6 
Commonalities To what extent do you think you have 
something in common with other Europeans? 
0-6 
EU identity index 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Additive index based on the five items above 
Cronach’s alpha is 0.79 at wave 1, 0.81 at 
wave 2, and 0.79 at wave 3 
0-6 
 
 
 
 
Contact with 
internationals (socializing) 
This part is about your daily interaction with 
international students, i.e. students from other 
countries.  
 
How frequently do you interact with 
international students in general? 
 
 
 
 
 
0 (not at all) to  
6 (very often) 
Contact with 
internationals (personal) 
How often do you discuss personal problems 
with international students?  
0-6 
Contact with 
internationals (academic) 
 
How often do you discuss academic affairs 
with international students? 
 
0-6 
Contact with hosts 
(socializing) 
This part is about your interaction with students 
who are at home in the country where you are 
spending your study abroad period. Students 
from other countries or other Erasmus students 
should not play a role here. 
 
How frequently do you interact with students 
who are at home in your host country in 
general? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 (not at all) to  
6 (very often) 
Contact with hosts 
(personal) 
How often do you talk about personal problems 
with students who are at home in your host 
country? 
0-6 
Contact with hosts 
(academic) 
How often do you talk about academic affairs 
with students who are at home in you host 
country? 
 
0-6 
Satisfaction w/ study 
abroad 
All things considered, how satisfied are you 
with your study abroad? 
0-6 
Ease of adaption Did you find it difficult to get used to your new 
environment? 
0-6 
Home sickness Did you feel home sick during your time 
abroad? 
0-6 
lived abroad Did you ever live abroad before your study 
abroad? 
0=no 
1=2-6 months 
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2=7-12 months 
3=more than a 
year 
frequency of travelling How often did you travel to another country 
within the past 12 months? 
0=not 
1=1-2 times 
2=3-4 times 
3=5-6 times 
4=7 or more 
Foreign language 
competence 
How many other languages do you speak 
besides your mother tongue, i.e. in how many 
other languages can you take part in a 
conversation?  
[number] 
Parents nationality Do your parents have the same nationality? 0=same 
1=different 
GAL-TAN ideology Some people consider themselves progressive 
or liberal, others rather see themselves as 
conservative. People who consider themselves 
progressive or liberal tend to favor an 
expansion of personal liberties, for example 
when it comes to abortion or same sex 
marriages. People who consider themselves 
conservative tend to favor a traditional notion 
of order, family and in regard to values. 
 
On a scale from 0 to 10, where would you see 
yourself? 0 means progressive or liberal views 
and 10 conservative views. 
0-10 
Left-right ideology In politics, people sometimes talk about left 
and right. On a left-right scale where 0 means 
left and 10 means right, where would you place 
yourself? 
0-10 
Reasons for students to 
study abroad / 
Non-cosmopolitan 
dummy 
To what extent do you consider the following 
considerations part of your motivation to study 
abroad. See all answer categories in Table 29. 
You can select up to three reasons. 
 
Note: The survey was administered in German; tenses were adjusted to situation/location of 
respondent. 
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Table 29: Reasons for students to study abroad 
Category Mentioned by  
 
Professional advancement  
Gain an advantage on the job market 45% 
To learn a specific skill 32% 
Acquire a specific certificate abroad 9% 
 
Cosmopolitan reasons   
Get a better understanding of another country 50% 
To travel 42% 
To see my own country from a different perspective 27% 
 
Ambiguous/other  
Improve my foreign language competence 82% 
Find out what I want to do with my life 21% 
It is a compulsory part of my curriculum 15% 
Open field remark 8% 
Because a friend also participates in a study abroad 4% 
  
Note: Participants could select up to three reasons simultaneously. 
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Table 30: Robustness check: social interactions and European identity (while abroad) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Contact w/ international students 0.11** 0.11* 0.30 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) 
Contact w/ internationals*pre-EU ID    -0.05 
   (0.04) 
Contact w/ host country students 0.06 0.06 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Contact w/ hosts*pre-EU ID   -0.02 
   (0.02) 
age  0.03 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
sex  0.08 0.08 
  (0.13) (0.13) 
lived abroad  0.00 0.00 
  (0.13) (0.13) 
frequency of travelling   0.05 0.05 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Foreign language competence  -0.07 -0.07 
  (0.09) (0.09) 
Parents nationality  -0.02 -0.03 
  (0.23) (0.23) 
Non-cosmopolitan  0.23 0.27 
  (0.26) (0.25) 
European identity before going abroad (Yt-1) 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.95*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.24) 
Constant 0.33 -0.43 -1.45 
 (0.35) (1.06) (1.46) 
Adjusted R2 0.54 0.53 0.53 
    
N 124 124 124 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses 
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!
Figure 11: Marginal effect of contact with international students (alternative operationalization) 
 
 
 
 
 
!
Figure 12: Marginal effect of contact with students from host country (alternative operationalization) 
 !!
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Table 31: Question wording II (panel data set) 
Variable Name Question range 
 
European identity index 
 
EU citizenship Do you ever think yourself as citizen of Europe? 0-6 
EU attachment People may feel different levels of attachment towards 
different geographical areas. How attached do you feel to 
Europe?  
0-6 
Closeness How close do you feel to Europeans? 0-6 
Pride Are you proud of being European? 0-6 
Commonalities How many things do you feel you have in common with 
other Europeans? 
0-6 
 
Social integration 
 
Foreign EU 
citizens: jobs 
When jobs are scarce, German companies should prioritize 
German workers over workers from other EU countries 
who want to work in Germany. (Agree strongly, agree 
somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly)  
RECODED: higher values mean higher approval of EU 
migrants 
 
1-4 
Foreign EU 
citizens: elections 
 
Citizens of other EU member states who live in Germany 
should be allowed to participate in local elections in 
Germany 
 
1-4 
 
Political integration 
 
power 
EU Com.  
 
 
The European Commission ought to become the true 
government of the European Union (Agree strongly, agree 
somewhat, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly) 
1-4 
power EP The powers of the European Parliament ought to be 
strengthened. 
 
1-4 
Power member 
states 
The member states out to remain the central actors of the 
European Union. (Agree strongly, agree somewhat, 
disagree somewhat, disagree strongly) 
! recoded so that higher values indicate a preference for 
the EU to be more powerful 
1-4 
  
Interest in the EU 
 
Are you generally interested in EU affairs? 0-6 
EP election 
voting 
A lot of people do not participate in European Parliament 
elections. Other people consider a civic duty to participate 
in these elections. Do you consider it disregarding civic 
duties if one does not participate in European Parliament 
elections? (yes/rather yes/rather no/no) 
1-4 
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!
Figure 13: European identity priming 
!
 
Figure 14: National identity priming 
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!
Figure 15: Elite cueing (consensus condition) 
 
!
Figure 16: Elite cueing (dissent condition) 
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